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Since approval of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2016, it has been 
widely and repeatedly claimed that the GDPR will legally mandate a ‘right to explanation’ of 
all decisions made by automated or artificially intelligent algorithmic systems. This right to 
explanation is viewed as an ideal mechanism to enhance the accountability and transparency 
of automated decision-making. However, there are several reasons to doubt both the legal 
existence and the feasibility of such a right. In contrast to the right to explanation of specific 
automated decisions claimed elsewhere, the GDPR only mandates that data subjects receive 
meaningful, but properly limited, information (Articles 13-15) about the logic involved, as well 
as the significance and the envisaged consequences of automated decision-making systems, 
what we term a ‘right to be informed’. Further, the ambiguity and limited scope of the ‘right 
not to be subject to automated decision-making’ contained in Article 22 (from which the 
alleged ‘right to explanation’ stems) raises questions over the protection actually afforded to 
data subjects. These problems show that the GDPR lacks precise language as well as explicit 
and well-defined rights and safeguards against automated decision-making, and therefore runs 
the risk of being toothless. We propose a number of legislative and policy steps that, if taken, 
may improve the transparency and accountability of automated decision-making when the 
GDPR comes into force in 2018.  
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In recent months, researchers,2 government bodies,3 and the media4 have claimed that a ‘right 
to explanation’ of decisions made by automated and artificially intelligent algorithmic systems 
is legally mandated by the forthcoming EU General Data Protection Regulation5 2016/679 
                                                 
 
1 We are deeply indebted to Prof. Peggy Valcke, Prof. Massimo Durante, Prof. Ugo Pagallo, Dr. Natascha Scherzer 
and Mag. Priska Lueger for their invaluable comments and insightful feedback, from which the paper greatly 
benefitted. We want to especially thank Dr. Alessandro Spina whose intensive review and in-depth comments 
strengthened the arguments in the paper. Further we are greatly thankful to Dr. Joris van Hoboken for the inspiring 
conversation as well as written feedback on the draft that significantly improved the quality of the paper. Further 
we want to thank Prof. Tal Zarsky and Prof. Lee Bygrave not only for their pioneering and ground-breaking work 
that inspired this paper, but also their positive feedback, in-depth review and invaluable comments. Last but not 
least we want to thank the anonymous reviewer for the time spent reading and commenting so thoroughly on the 
paper. 
2 See for example: Bryce Goodman and Seth Flaxman, ‘EU Regulations on Algorithmic Decision-Making and a 
“Right to Explanation”’ [2016] arXiv:1606.08813 [cs, stat] <http://arxiv.org/abs/1606.08813> accessed 30 June 
2016; Francesca Rossi, ‘Artificial Intelligence: Potential Benefits and  Ethical Considerations’ (European 
Parliament: Policy Department C:  Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs 2016) Briefing PE 571.380 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/571380/IPOL_BRI(2016)571380_EN.pdf>; 
Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘The New Imbroglio - Living with Machine Algorithms’, The Art of Ethics in the 
Information Society (2016) <https://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/75/> accessed 28 December 2016; 
IEEE Global Initiative, ‘Ethically Aligned Designed - A Vision for Prioritizing Human Wellbeing with 
Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems’ (IEEE 2016) Version 1 
<http://standards.ieee.org/develop/indconn/ec/ead_v1.pdf> accessed 19 January 2017; Ben Wagner, ‘Efficiency 
vs. Accountability? – Algorithms, Big Data and Public Administration’ <https://cihr.eu/efficiency-vs-
accountability-algorithms-big-data-and-public-administration/> accessed 14 January 2017; Fusion, ‘EU 
Introduces “Right to Explanation” on Algorithms | Fusion’ (2016) <http://fusion.net/story/321178/european-
union-right-to-algorithmic-explanation/> accessed 10 November 2016. quoting Ryan Calo. 
3 See for example: Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Overview of the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR)’ (Information Commissioner’s Office 2016) 1.1.1 <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/data-protection-
reform/overview-of-the-gdpr/individuals-rights/rights-related-to-automated-decision-making-and-profiling/> 
accessed 10 November 2016; House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, ‘Robotics and Artificial 
Intelligence’ (House of Commons 2016) HC 145 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmsctech/145/145.pdf> accessed 10 November 
2016; European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, ‘Report with Recommendations to the Commission on 
Civil Law Rules on Robotics’ (European Parliament 2017) 2015/2103(INL) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2017-
0005+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> accessed 11 November 2016. 
4 See for example: Joon Ian Wong, ‘The UK Could Become a Leader in AI Ethics—if This EU Data Law 
Survives Brexit’ <http://qz.com/807303/uk-parliament-ai-and-robotics-report-brexit-could-affect-eu-gdpr-right-
to-explanation-law/> accessed 10 November 2016; Cade Metz, ‘Artificial Intelligence Is Setting Up the Internet 
for a Huge Clash With Europe’ (WIRED, 2016) <https://www.wired.com/2016/07/artificial-intelligence-setting-
internet-huge-clash-europe/> accessed 10 November 2016; Fusion (n 2); Bernard Marr, ‘New Report: Revealing 
The Secrets Of AI Or Killing Machine Learning?’ <http://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/01/12/new-
report-revealing-the-secrets-of-ai-or-killing-machine-learning/#258189058e56> accessed 14 January 2017; 
Liisa Jaakonsaari, ‘Who Sets the Agenda on Algorithmic Accountability?’ (EURACTIV.com, 26 October 2016) 
<https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/opinion/who-sets-the-agenda-on-algorithmic-accountability/> 
accessed 3 March 2017; Nick Wallace, ‘EU’s Right to Explanation: A Harmful Restriction on Artificial 
Intelligence’ <https://www.datainnovation.org/2017/01/eus-right-to-explanation-a-harmful-restriction-on-
artificial-intelligence/> accessed 3 March 2017. 
5 REGULATION (EU) 2016/679  OF THE EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND OF THE COUNCIL  of 27 
April 2016  on the protection  of natural  persons  with regard  to the processing  of personal  data and on the 
free  movement  of such data, and repealing  Directive  95/46/EC  (General  Data Protection  Regulation) 2016. 





(GDPR). The right to explanation is viewed as a promising mechanism in the broader pursuit 
by government and industry for accountability and transparency in algorithms, artificial 
intelligence, robotics, and other automated systems.6 Automated systems can have many 
unintended and unexpected effects.7 Public assessment of the extent and source of these 
problems is often difficult,8 owing to the use of complex and opaque algorithmic mechanisms.9 
The alleged right to explanation would require data controllers to explain how such 
mechanisms reach decisions. Significant hype has been mounting over the empowering effects 
of such a legally enforceable right for data subjects, and the disruption of data intensive 
industries, which would be forced to explain how complex and perhaps inscrutable automated 
methods work in practice.  
However, there are several reasons to doubt the existence, scope, and feasibility of a 
‘right to explanation’ of automated decisions. In this paper, we examine the legal status of the 
‘right to explanation’ in the GDPR, and identify several barriers undermining its 
implementation. We argue that the GDPR does not, in its current form, implement a right to 
explanation, but rather what we term a limited ‘right to be informed’. Here is a quick overview. 
In Section 2, we disentangle the types and timing of explanations that can be offered of 
automated decision-making. The right to explanation, as popularly proposed, is thought to grant 
an explanation of specific automated decisions, after such a decision has been made.10 
                                                 
 
6 The proliferation of unaccountable and inscrutable automated systems has proven a major concern among 
government bodies, as reflected in numerous recent reports on the future ethical and social impacts of automated 
systems. See for instance: Catherine Stupp, ‘Commission to Open Probe into Tech Companies’ Algorithms next 
Year’ (EurActiv.com, 8 November 2016) <http://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/commission-to-open-
probe-into-tech-companies-algorithms-next-year/> accessed 11 November 2016; Partnership on AI, ‘Partnership 
on Artificial Intelligence to Benefit People and Society’ (Partnership on Artificial Intelligence to Benefit People 
and Society, 2016) <https://www.partnershiponai.org/> accessed 11 November 2016; National Science and 
Technology Council, ‘Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence’ (Executive Office of the President 
2016) 
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_futu
re_of_ai.pdf> accessed 11 November 2016; European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs (n 3); House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee (n 3); Government Office for Science, ‘Artificial Intelligence: 
An Overview for Policy-Makers’ (Government Office for Science 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/artificial-intelligence-an-overview-for-policy-makers> accessed 
11 November 2016. 
7 Brent Mittelstadt and others, ‘The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the Debate’ [2016] 3 Big Data & Society 2. 
8 Christian Sandvig and others, ‘Auditing Algorithms: Research Methods for Detecting Discrimination on 
Internet Platforms’ [2014] Data and Discrimination: Converting Critical Concerns into Productive Inquiry 
<http://social.cs.uiuc.edu/papers/pdfs/ICA2014-Sandvig.pdf> accessed 13 February 2016. 
9 Mike Ananny, ‘Toward an Ethics of Algorithms Convening, Observation, Probability, and Timeliness’ (2016) 
41 Science, Technology & Human Values 93. 
10 This is the type of explanation of automated decision-making imagined in Recital 71 GDPR, which states “In 
any case, such processing should be subject to suitable safeguards, which should include specific information to 





In Section 3, we assess three possible legal bases for a right to explanation in the GDPR:  
1) the right not to be subject to automated decision-making and safeguards enacted thereof 
(Article 22 and Recital 71);  
2) notification duties of data controllers (Articles 13-14 and Recitals 60-62); and  
3) the right to access (Article 15 and Recital 63).  
The aforementioned claim for a right to explanation11 muddles the first and second legal bases. 
It conflates (1) legally binding requirements of Article 22 and non-binding provisions of Recital 
71 and (2) notification duties (Articles 13-14) that require data subjects to be provided with 
information about “the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred 
to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic 
involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the 
data subject” [italics added].  
Having challenged the legal basis for a right to explanation, we then consider whether 
the right of access in Article 15 provides a stronger legal basis. Following our analysis of the 
implementation and jurisprudence of the 1995 Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), we argue 
that the GDPR’s right of access allows for a limited right to explanation of the functionality of 
automated decision-making systems – what we refer to as the ‘right to be informed’. However, 
the right of access does not establish a right to explanation of specific automated decisions of 
the type currently imagined elsewhere in public discourse. Not only is a right to explanation of 
specific decisions not granted by the GDPR, it also appears to have been intentionally not 
adopted in the final text of the GDPR after appearing in an earlier draft.  
In Section 4, we consider the limitations of scope and applicability, if a right to 
explanation were to exist. We show that a ‘general’ right to explanation, applicable to all 
automated decisions, would not exist even if Recital 71 were legally binding. A right to 
explanation, derived from the right of access (Article 15) or safeguards described in Article 
22(3), would only apply to a narrow range of decisions “solely based on automated processing” 
and with “legal” or “similarly significant” effects for the data subject (Article 22(1) GDPR). 
We examine the limited cases in which the right would apply, including the impact of a critical 
                                                 
 
the data subject and the right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an 
explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision.” 
11 Goodman and Flaxman (n 2). 





ambiguity of language that allows the broader “right not to be subject to automated decision-
making” (Article 22 GDPR) to be interpreted either as a prohibition, or right to object.  
Section 5 concludes the article with recommendations for a number of legislative and 
policy steps that, if implemented, may improve the transparency and accountability of 
automated decision-making when the GDPR comes into force in 2018. 
2 What is meant by a right to explanation? 
Before examining whether the GDPR specifies a right to explanation, it is necessary to examine 
what one may mean by an ‘explanation’ of automated decision-making. Two kinds of 
explanations may be in question, depending on whether one refers to:  
● system functionality, that is, the logic, significance, envisaged consequences and 
general functionality of an automated decision-making system, e.g. the system’s 
requirements specification, decision trees, pre-defined models, criteria, and 
classification structures; or to 
● specific decisions, that is, the rationale, reasons, and individual circumstances of a 
specific automated decision, e.g. the weighting of features, machine-defined case-
specific decision rules, information about reference or profile groups.12 
Furthermore, one can also distinguish between explanations in terms of their timing in relation 
to the decision-making process: 
 an ex ante explanation occurs prior to an automated decision-making taking place. Note 
that an ex ante explanation can logically address only system functionality, as the 
rationale of a specific decision cannot be known before the decision is made; 
 an ex post explanation occurs after an automated decision has taken place. Note that an 
ex post explanation can address both system functionality and the rationale of a specific 
decision. 
An example may help clarify how these distinctions interact. Take an automated credit scoring 
system. Prior to a decision being made (ex ante), the system provider can inform the data 
subject about the system functionality, including the general logic (such as types of data and 
features considered, categories in the decision tree), purpose or significance (in this case, to 
                                                 
 
12 This is specifically a kind of explanation possible only once a decision has been taken. It refers to a particular 
decision, not the decision-making method or system itself. This is the type of explanation imagined in Recital 71 
GDPR, which calls for “an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment.” The Recital explicitly 
refers to a singular decision that has been reached. 





assign a credit score), and envisaged consequences (for example, the credit score can be used 
by lenders to assess credit worthiness, affecting the terms of credit such as interest rate). After 
a decision has been made (ex post), an explanation of system functionality can still be provided 
to the data subject. However, the provider can also explain to the data subject the logic and 
individual circumstances of their specific decision, such as her credit score, the data or features 
that were considered in her particular case, and their weighting within the decision tree or 
model. In other words, the provider can explain how a particular score was assigned. Further, 
when pre-defined simplistic or linear models are used and fully disclosed, predictions about 
the rationale of a specific decision are possible in principle ex ante. However, in both cases the 
provider’s ability to offer an explanation of the rationale of a specific decision may be limited 
by several legal (see Section 4) and technical factors, including the use of complex probabilistic 
analytics and decision-making methods.13  
These distinctions between two kinds and two different timings of explanations are 
implicit in the GDPR. Their importance will be highlighted as we examine the possible legal 
bases for a right to explanation.  
 
3 Why there is no ‘right to explanation’ in the GDPR 
Three distinct possible legal bases for a right to explanation of automated decision-making can 
be found in the GDPR. A right to explanation can possibly be derived from: 
1) safeguards against automated decision-making as required under Article 22(3), and 
commented upon by Recital 71; 
2) notification duties under Articles 13-14 commented upon by Recitals 60-62; or  
3) the right of access under Article 15, and commented upon by Recital 63.  
These bases are respectively referred to as a right to explanation derived from (1) safeguards, 
(2) notification duties, and (3) the right of access. We will assess each in turn. On the whole, 
the claim that a right is granted by the GDPR to an ex post explanation of specific decisions (at 
a minimum) that seemingly applies to any instance of automated decision-making is based on 
a combination of safeguards and notification duties. It combines non-binding Recital 71 with 
binding provisions of Articles 13-14 and 22 to argue that “The law will […] effectively create 
                                                 
 
13 Jenna Burrell, ‘How the Machine “Thinks:” Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning Algorithms’ [2016] 
Big Data & Society. 





a “right to explanation,” whereby a user can ask for an explanation of an algorithmic decision 
that was made about them.”14  This claim is incorrect for several reasons, explained below.  
3.1 A right to explanation derived from safeguards against automated decision-making 
Starting with the claim15  for a right to explanation derived from safeguards, Article 22 (see: 
Figure 1) and Recital 71 of the GDPR address a data subject’s right not to be subject to 
automated decision-making. Article 22(3), which addresses safeguards against automated 
decision-making, states that  
the data controller shall implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's 
rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human 
intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view and to 
contest the decision [italics added].  
 
Critically, a right to explanation is not mentioned. Rather, after a decision has been made, and 
assuming the decision meets a condition specified in Article 22(3)a (to enter or fulfil a contract) 
or Article 22(3)c (with explicit consent), data subjects are granted additional safeguards to 
obtain human intervention, express views, or contest a decision (Article 22(3)), but not to 
obtain an explanation of the decision reached. 
 
 
                                                 
 
14 Goodman and Flaxman (n 2). The ‘right to explanation is proposed as follows. On p. 1: “The law will also 
effectively create a “right to explanation,” whereby a user can ask for an explanation of an algorithmic decision 
that was made about them.” Further, on p. 3: “Paragraph 71 of the recitals (the preamble to the GDPR, which 
explains the rationale behind it but is not itself law) explicitly requires data controllers to “implement appropriate 
technical and organizational measures” that “prevents, inter alia, discriminatory effects” on the basis of processing 
sensitive data.” Further, on p. 6: “The provisions outlined in Articles 13-15 specify that data subjects have the 
right to access information collected about them, and also requires data processors to ensure data subjects are 
notified about the data collected. However, it is important to distinguish between these rights, which may be 
termed the right to access and notification, and additional “safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data 
subject” required under Article 22 when profiling takes place. Although the Article does not elaborate what these 
safeguards are beyond “the right to obtain human intervention”, Articles 13 and 14 state that, when profiling takes 
place, a data subject has the right to “meaningful information about the logic involved.”  This requirement prompts 
the question:  what does it mean, and what is required, to explain an algorithm’s decision?” 
15 ibid; Rossi (n 2). 






In all of the GDPR, a right to explanation is only explicitly mentioned in Recital 71, which 
states that a person who has been subject to automated decision-making  
should be subject to suitable safeguards, which should include specific information to 
the data subject and the right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point 
of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to 
challenge the decision [italics added].  
 
If legally binding, this provision would require an ex post explanation of specific decisions, as 
Recital 71 addresses safeguards to be in place once a decision has been reached. To show why 
Recital 71 does not establish a legally binding right, a brief aside into the legal status of Recitals 
is required. 





Recitals provide guidance16 on how to interpret the Articles, but are not themselves 
legally binding.17 As Klimas and Vaiciukaite explain, “Recitals have no positive operation of 
their own” and “cannot cause legitimate expectations to arise.”18 Baratta further expands:  
In principle the ECJ does not give effect to recitals that are drafted in normative terms. 
Recitals can help to explain the purpose and intent behind a normative instrument. They 
can also be taken into account to resolve ambiguities in the legislative provisions to 
which they relate, but they do not have any autonomous legal effect.19  
 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) shows that the role of Recitals is to 
dissolve ambiguity in the operative text of a framework. The ECJ has commented directly on 
the legal status of Recitals, clarifying that: “Whilst a recital in the preamble to a regulation may 
cast light on the interpretation to be given to a legal rule, it cannot in itself constitute such a 
rule.”20  
Returning to the GDPR, Article 22(3) lists the minimum requirements that have to be 
met for lawful automated decision-making. There are no ambiguities in the language that would 
require further interpretation with regard to the minimum requirements that must be met by 
data controllers. As long as these requirements are met, automated decision-making is lawful 
and in compliance with the GDPR. With this said, future jurisprudence (see Section 4) can still 
interpret the meaning of “suitable measures to safeguard,” and establish future mandatory or 
case-to-case requirements to be met by data controllers, including a right to explanation. This 
is, however, only one possible future. A right to explanation is thus not currently legally 
mandated by the requirements set in Article 22(3).   
                                                 
 
16“Recitals explain the background to the legislation and the aims and objectives of the legislation. They are, 
therefore, important to an understanding of the legislation which follows.” EUROPA, ‘Guide to the 
Approximation of EU Environmental Legislation ANNEX I’ (Environment, 2015) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/guide/annex1.htm> accessed 3 March 2017. See also Judgement of 15 
5 1997 - Case C-355/95 P Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH (TWD) v Commission of the European Communities 
and Federal Republic of Germany [1997] European Court of Justice C-355/95 P [21]: “In that regard, it should 
be stated that the operative part of an act is indissociably linked to the statement of reasons for it, so that, when it 
has to be interpreted, account must be taken of the reasons which led to its adoption.” 
17 For a detailed overview of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice on the limited role of Recitals in 
EU law see Roberto Baratta, ‘Complexity of EU Law in the Domestic Implementing Process’ (2014) 2 The Theory 
and Practice of Legislation 293. An opposing view is offered by Pagallo, who claims that secondary rules of law 
(e.g. Recitals) can alter primary rules of law. Ugo Pagallo, ‘Three Lessons Learned for Intelligent Transport 
Systems That Abide by the Law’ (2016) November 2016 Jusletter IT RZ 13 <http://jusletter-
it.weblaw.ch/issues/2016/24-November-2016/three-lessons-learne_9251e5d324.html>. 
18 Tadas Klimas and Jurate Vaiciukaite, ‘The Law of Recitals in European Community Legislation’ (2008) 15 
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 32–3 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1159604> accessed 22 January 2017. The paper discusses 
in detail the legal status of Recitals in European law.  
19 Baratta (n 17) 17. 
20 Case 215/88 Casa Fleischhandels [1989] European Court of Justice ECR 2789 [31]; See also Baratta (n 17) 13. 





In addition, rights have to be explicitly legally established prior to their enforcement. 
This idea stems from the relationship between legal rights and duties. The scope of a right can 
be subject to interpretation; a legal basis for its existence must, however, first be beyond doubt. 
Rights of data subjects typically correspond with a duty on the side of the data controller.21 
Negligence in relation to legal duties can be punished through fines and other procedures. It 
would be highly controversial to impose fines on data controllers without having previously 
clarified explicitly and beyond doubt what duties must be met. Doing otherwise would conflict 
with the principles of fair trial (Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) and the rule of law.22 
Criminal and administrative procedures have to be laid down precisely.  
It can be concluded that data subjects will not be granted a legally binding ex post right 
to explanation of specific automated decisions on the basis of legal safeguards in Article 22 as 
it currently stands. That this is the case does not appear to be the result of an oversight or 
fiddling with subtle interpretations (e.g. the meaning of “suitable measures to safeguard” in 
Article 22(3)). On the contrary, the omission of a right to explanation from Article 22 appears 
to be intentional. The safeguards specified in Recital 71 are almost identical to those in Article 
22(3), with the significant difference of the further inclusion of a right “to obtain an explanation 
of the decision reached after such assessment” in Recital 71. The purposeful omission of this 
text from Article 22 may not be an oversight but suggests that legislators did not intend to 
implement a right to explanation of specific decisions in the GDPR. What happened? 
Looking at previous drafts of the GDPR and commentary from the trilogue 
negotiations,23 one can see that legislators had stricter safeguards in place on automated 
decision-making and profiling, but that these were eventually dropped, including a legally 
binding right to explanation of specific decisions.24 An early indication of the debate around 
                                                 
 
21 Peter Jones, ‘Group Rights’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 Edition (forthcoming), 
2016) <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/rights-group/>. 
22
 Christoph Grabenwarter, The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms: A Commentary (01 edition, Beck/Hart Publishing 2014). 
23 The ‘trilogue negotiations’ describe a series of meetings between the European Commission, Council and 
Parliament to adopt a final text for the GDPR. For an introduction and discussion of the legal basis of trilogue, 
see: Oliver Proust, ‘Unravelling the Mysteries of the GDPR Trilogues’ (Privacy, Security and Information Law, 
2015) <http://privacylawblog.fieldfisher.com/2015/unravelling-the-mysteries-of-the-gdpr-trilogues/> accessed 
16 December 2016.  
24 Rita Heimes, ‘Top 10 Operational Impacts of the GDPR: Part 5 - Profiling’ <https://iapp.org/news/a/top-10-
operational-impacts-of-the-gdpr-part-5-profiling/> accessed 10 November 2016: “A hotly contested provision of 
the GDPR, the “profiling” restrictions ultimately adopted were narrower than initially proposed.” 





the right to explanation can be seen in the November 2013 report of the European Parliament25 
(EP) and the December 2014 report of the European Council in response to the original GDPR 
text proposed by the European Commission26 (EC) in 2012.  
The EC’s proposed text did not contain a right to explanation. The EP proposed the 
following amendment to Article 20 (now Article 22 in the adopted version of the GDPR), 
paragraph 5:  
Profiling which leads to measures producing legal effects concerning the data subject 
or does similarly significantly affect the interests, rights or freedoms of the concerned 
data subject shall not be based solely or predominantly on automated processing and 
shall include human assessment, including an explanation of the decision reached after 
such an assessment. The suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's legitimate 
interests referred to in paragraph 2 shall include the right to obtain human assessment 
and an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment […] [italics added]. 
 
The EP’s preferred text mandated a “right to obtain human assessment and an explanation of 
the decision reached after such assessment.” These safeguards would have been part of Article 
20, meaning that they would have been legally binding. However, the proposed safeguards 
were not adopted in trilogue. This change suggests that legislators intentionally chose to make 
the right to explanation non-binding by placing it in Recital 71. 
The European Council’s 2014 draft,27 on the other hand, only required that  
the data controller shall implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s 
rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, such as the right to obtain human 
intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view and to 
contest the decision [italics added].  
 
The Council suggested to add the text:   
                                                 
 
25 European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, ‘Report on the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation) - 
A7-0402/2013’ (European Parliament 2013) A7–0402/2013 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2013-0402&language=EN> 
accessed 10 November 2016. 
26 European Commission, ‘Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General 
Data Protection Regulation)’ (European Commission 2012) 2012/0011 (COD) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf> accessed 10 November 2016. 
27 European Digital Rights, ‘Comparison of the Parliament and Council Text on the General Data Protection 
Regulation’ (European Digital Rights International 2016) 140 
<https://edri.org/files/EP_Council_Comparison.pdf> accessed 20 November 2016. This source provides a side-
by-side comparison of the aforementioned drafts from the European Parliament (n 25) and European Commission 
(n 26), as well as amendments to the Commission’s text proposed by the European Council. 





to express his or her point of view, to get an explanation of the decision reached after 
such assessment and the right to contest the decision [italics added],  
 
to Recital 58 (equivalent to Recital 71 GDPR).28 The Council thus suggested to place the right 
to explanation added in the EP’s draft in a Recital. This approach was eventually taken in the 
final text adopted in 2016. 
Interestingly, despite years of negotiations, the final wording of the GDPR concerning 
protections against profiling and automated decision-making hardly changed from the relevant 
Articles and Recitals of the Data Protection Directive 1995. As with the GDPR, a ‘right to 
explanation’ does not appear in Article 15 of the Directive (see Figure 2), which addresses 
automated individual decisions.  
Although Article 22 GDPR has not greatly changed from Article 15 of the Directive, a 
few changes are still noteworthy. First, the only safeguard against automated decision-making 
mentioned in the Directive is the opportunity to express one’s views. Article 22(3) additionally 
names contesting the decision and the right to obtain human intervention as suitable measures. 
Secondly, explicit consent is included as a case in which automated decision-making is allowed 
(Article 22(2)c). Finally, as opposed to the provisions in Article 15 of the Directive, it is no 
longer necessary that the data subject requests the contract in order for automated decision-
making to be lawful.   
                                                 
 
28 European Digital Rights (n 27) 40. 






3.2 A right to explanation derived from notification duties 
Articles 13 and 14 GDPR specify notification duties for data controllers concerning the 
processing of data collected from the data subject (Article 13) or from a third party (Article 
14). In the aforementioned claim, these Articles are cited as a basis for a right to an ex post 
explanation of specific decisions. The claim starts with Articles 13(2) and 14(2), which state 
that data controllers need to  
provide the data subject with the following information necessary to ensure fair and 
transparent processing. 
 
According to Article 13(2)f and Article 14(2)g, this information includes  
the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Article 
22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic 
involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing 
for the data subject [italics added]. 
 
 This duty applies in cases of automated processing meeting the requirements of Article 22(1) 
or 22(4) (more on this later).  
It has been suggested that the notification duties in Articles 13-14, in combination with 
the safeguards defined in Article 22(3), grant an ex post right to explanation of the “existence 





of […] logic involved […] significance […] and envisaged consequences” of automated 
decision-making.29 This claim is mistaken for two reasons.  
First, only an ex ante explanation of system functionality is explicitly required by 
Articles 13(2)f and 14(2)g. These notification duties precede decision-making. Notification 
occurs before a decision is made, at the point when data is collected for processing. This holds 
true even if Article 14 introduces some ambiguities when data are collected from third parties 
rather than data subjects (insofar as the controller needs only to notify the data subject within 
30 days of collection). As explained in Section 2, only an explanation of system functionality 
is logically possible prior to decision-making. Therefore Articles 13-14 cannot be used as 
evidence of an ex post right to explanation of specific decisions that can logically only be given 
once a decision has been made (timeline problem).30 
Secondly, the claim links Articles 13(2)f and 14(2)g to the safeguards in Article 22(3). 
This link is not made in the GDPR. Articles 13(2)f and 14(2)g apply only to Article 22(1) and 
Article 22(4), which do not address safeguards against automated decision-making. The 
supposed link – between notification about the logic involved, significance and envisaged 
consequences of automated decision-making in Articles 13-14, and the ex post right to 
explanation  incorrectly attributed to Article 22(3) (which only features in Recital 71) – is 
therefore untenable and can be dismissed. The claim also conflates the legally binding 
notification duties, specified in Articles 13-14, and the non-binding right, specified in Recital 
71.  
It follows that the claim for an ex post right to explanation of specific decisions31 is not 
correct. Any suggestion to the contrary fails to distinguish between (1) the legally binding duty 
to notify the data subject of the logic involved, significance and envisaged consequences of 
automated decision-making system before decision-making occurs (timeline problem) 
                                                 
 
29 Goodman and Flaxman (n 2). 
30 See also Suzanne Rodway, ‘Just How Fair Will Processing Notices Need to Be under the GDPR’ (2016) 16 
Privacy & Data Protection 16.  Note the paper focused on the EC draft but talks in general about the aim and 
purpose of notification duties. The author explains that these provisions mainly mean that data controllers have to 
update their privacy notices. Further: “whether any automated decisions will be made using the data (including 
for profiling purposes) and, if so, a meaningful explanation about the logic used in those decisions and the possible 
consequences of those decisions for the data subject. Examples include whether a credit card application might 
be declined or a job application rejected.” This suggests that Articles 13-14 only create a notification duty to 
inform about the general usage of automated decision-making before a decision has been made, and to inform 
about the possible future consequences. Further support for this argument can be found in Recitals 60-62 GDPR. 
31 Goodman and Flaxman (n 2). 





(Articles 13-14), and (2) the data subject’s non-binding right to an explanation of specific 
decisions (Recital 71) after decision-making occurs.  
The language used in Articles 13(2)f and 14(2)g also supports the interpretation that 
only an ex ante explanation is required. Data controllers must inform the data subject about the  
existence of automated decision-making, including profiling […] [and provide data 
subjects with] meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the 
significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing.  
 
The language used suggests that data subjects must be provided with information about how 
an automated decision-making system works in general, for which purposes, and with what 
predicted impact, before automated decisions are made. Notably this cannot include any 
information about how a specific decision was made or reached, but rather addresses how the 
system itself functions, e.g. its decision tree or rules, or predictions about how inputs will be 
processed. For fully disclosed simplistic or linear models, this may show how specific decisions 
would be reached in the future.32  
3.3 A right to explanation derived from the right of access 
In contrast to prior claims (see Section 1), it may also be possible to derive a right to explanation 
from the right of access established in Article 15 GDPR. Article 15(1)h is identical to Articles 
13(2)f and 14(2)h: data subjects are granted a right to be informed about the existence of 
automated decision-making and to obtain meaningful information about the significance, 
envisaged consequences, and logic involved. Specifically, the subject should be informed about 
the existence, purposes, and logic of data processing, and the intentions and legal consequences 
of such processing. By having this information, the data subject should be able to examine the 
lawfulness of data processing and invoke legal remedies.33 
Together, Articles 13-15 form what has been called the ‘Magna Carta’ of data subject’s 
rights to obtain information about the data held about them, and to scrutinise the legitimacy of 
data processing.34 Articles 13-14 create notification duties for data controllers, while Article 
                                                 
 
32 Burrell (n 13). 
33 Boris P. Paal, ‘DS-GVO Art. 15 Auskunftsrecht der betroffenen Person’ in Paal and Pauly (eds), Datenschutz-
Grundverordnung (1st edn, beck-online 2017) Rn. 3. Recital 63 GDPR also supports this interpretation in stating 
that “A data subject should have the right of access to personal data […] and to exercise that right […] in order 
to be aware of, and verify, the lawfulness of processing” [italics added].  
34 Florian Schmidt-Wudy, ‘DS-GVO Art. 15 Auskunftsrecht der betroffenen Person’ in Wolff and Brink (eds), 
Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (18th edn, beck-online 2016) Rn. 2. 





15 establishes a corresponding right of access for data subjects.35 In contrast to the notification 
duties of data controllers in Articles 13-14, the right of access has to be invoked by the data 
subject. The articles are a unit, insofar as they provide the data subject access to identical 
information, and use the same language.  
Although seemingly insignificant, the change from a notification duty to an access right 
has important consequences for the timing of explanations required from the data controller. 
Given that the phrasing of Article 15(1)h is identical to Articles 13(2)f and 14 (2)g, one could 
assume that the right of access similarly only grants access to an ex ante explanation of system 
functionality. However, the right of access is dependent upon the request of the data subject 
and has no deadline; the ‘timeline problem’ of Articles 13(2)f and 14(2)g does not apply. At 
first glance, the data subject can request this information at any time, including after an 
automated decision has been made, making an ex post explanation of the rationale of specific 
decisions plausible. 
 Nonetheless, it is reasonable to doubt that the right of access grants a right to ex post 
explanations of specific decisions already reached. Consider the semantics of Article 15(1)h. 
The phrase “envisaged consequences” is future-oriented, suggesting that the data controller 
must inform the data subject of possible consequences of the automated decision-making 
before such processing occurs. This interpretation follows the timeline constraints of identical 
provisions in Articles 13(2)f and 14(2)g discussed above, which only allow for ex ante 
explanations. Data controllers are required to predict the possible consequences of their 
automated decision-making methods. The term “envisaged” limits these predictions to ex ante 
explanations of system functionality, for instance concerning the general purpose of the system, 
or the type of impact to be expected from the type of decision it makes. For instance, a credit 
agency could predict that the scores they produce will impact on credit worthiness (e.g. interest 
rates). If applied to decisions already made, the phrasing becomes incoherent.36 It would seem 
                                                 
 
35 Mario Martini, ‘DS-GVO Art. 22 Automatisierte Entscheidungen im Einzelfall einschließlich Profiling’ in Paal 
and Pauly (eds), Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (1st edn, beck-online 2017) Rn. 4-6. 
36 Peter Bräutigam and Florian Schmidt-Wudy, ‘Das geplante Auskunfts- und Herausgaberecht des Betroffenen 
nach Art. 15 Der EU-Datenschutzgrundverordnung’ (2015) 31 Computer und Recht 56, 62 supports this 
interpretation in commenting on the EP’s draft of the GDPR. The EP’s draft contains the same phrasing as the 
final adopted text: Article 15(h) requires information about “the significance and envisaged consequences of such 
processing.” The authors note that the phrasing is very imprecise. An example is given of an Internet provider 
being obligated to inform that automated processing methods are being used to determine creditworthiness, which 
could lead to the consequence that the person has to pay in advance (rather than being offered credit). This example 
suggests that the authors believe that Article 15(h) aims to inform about system functionality rather than to provide 
information about how an individual decision was reached. 





to require data controllers to predict the personal consequences of decision-making for 
individual data subjects after an automated decision has been made, including how the decision 
could be used by other data controllers and processors. 
The semantics of the German translation of Article 15(1)h GDPR provides further 
support. The German Article 15(1)h states:  
Tragweite und angestrebten Auswirkungen einer derartigen Verarbeitung für die 
betroffene Person [italics added].  
 
This sentence translates to “the scope and intended consequences of such processing for the 
person concerned” [our translation, italics added]. This indicates that the data controller must 
inform the data subject about the consequences the controller wishes to achieve with automated 
decision-making. According to this phrasing, the data controller is not asked to predict 
consequences but rather explain the scope, intention, and the purpose of such processing. This 
suggests that the right of access is not addressing how an individual decision was reached, but 
rather the duty of the data controller to provide information about the existence, aims and 
consequences of such processing. This equates to an explanation of system functionality.37  
There are similar reasons to doubt that Article 15(1)h grants an ex post right to 
explanation of specific decisions. Data controllers are required to provide information about 
the “existence of automated decision-making” [italics added]. This phrase does not suggest an 
explanation of how a decision was reached. Rather, the data controller is only required to 
inform the data subject that automated decision-making methods are being used to process her 
data. 
The phrasing of Article 15(1)h, as with Articles 13-14, points to an explanation of 
system functionality. However, data controllers are also required to provide “meaningful 
information about the logic involved” in automated decision-making. As noted in Section 3.2, 
this phrase, as used in Articles 13-14, has been argued by others to grant an ex post right to 
explanation. If correct, Article 15(1)h would grant a right to explanation of specific decisions, 
not only system functionality, as the data subject can request the relevant information both 
                                                 
 
37 Prior drafts of Article 15 also support this view. The German translation of the EC draft stated in Article 15(h) 
“die Tragweite der Verarbeitung und die mit ihr angestrebten Auswirkungen, zumindest im Fall der Maßnahmen 
gemäß Artikel 20,” which translates to “the scope [rather than significance] of the data processing and its intended 
consequences.”  In addition, the EP draft stated in Article 15(h) “die Tragweite der Verarbeitung und die mit ihr 
angestrebten Wirkungen.” The phrase “angestrebten Wirkungen” translates to “the scope and its intended effects,” 
not consequences. Even though the adopted language in the GDPR is vaguer, prior drafts demonstrate Article 15 
was intended to inform data subjects about data processor’s “intended effects” for the data subject by using 
automated decision-making methods. For further discussion, see: ibid 61 ff. 





before and after a decision has been made. However, there are further reasons to doubt that this 
is the case. 
For Article 15(1)h to be coherent as a whole, “meaningful information about the logic 
involved” must be interpreted in connection with the other terms (existence of, meaningful 
information about significance and envisaged consequences) used of Article 15(1)h, which are 
limited to explanations of system functionality. Interpreting “logic involved” to grant an ex 
post explanation of specific decisions would mean the other terms of Article 15(1)h would be 
incoherent, if the right of access was invoked after a decision was made. This interpretation is 
further supported by a comparison of the language used in Article 15(1)h and Recital 71. Data 
controllers are obligated to provide information about the  
existence of automated decision-making […] meaningful information about the logic 
involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing 
(Article 15(1)h), [as opposed to] an explanation of the decision reached (Recital 71).   
 
The phrasing of Article 15(1)h is future-oriented, and appears to refer to the existence and 
planned scope of decision-making itself, rather than to the circumstances of a specific decision 
as suggested in Recital 71. If an explanation of specific automated decisions was intended to 
be granted by Article 15(1)h, as in Recital 71, the usage of different language between the two 
would be odd. 
Nevertheless, given the lack of an explicit deadline for invoking the right of access, one 
cannot be certain, on the basis of semantics alone, that the right of access is limited to 
explanations of system functionality. Despite this, we argue that, as with notification duties in 
Articles 13-14, and regardless of when it is invoked by the data subject, the GDPR’s right of 
access only grants an explanation of automated decision-making addressing system 
functionality, not the rationale and circumstances of specific decisions. This conclusion is 
supported by implementation of the 1995 Directive’s right of access by Member States, which 
has mostly limited informational obligations to system functionality. If interpretation of the 
GDPR follows historical precedence, its right of access will be similarly limited. To articulate 
this claim further, it is necessary to examine in detail Member State implementations and 
interpretations of the Directive’s right of access. 
3.3.1 Right of access in the 1995 Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC 
It is important to note that a right of access that grants data subjects some explanation of 
automated decision-making is not new, and has not proven an effective transparency 





mechanism.38 Rather, this right has existed since the 1995 Data Protection Directive, and has 
been implemented in national law by most European Member States.39 Similar to the scope of 
the GDPR’s right of access, the Directive’s right of access provides means for data subjects to 
discover whether a controller is processing personal data. If so, the data subject is then entitled 
to know the extent of data being processed. This shall enable the data subject to scrutinise what 
data are used and take appropriate action such as requesting rectification or erasure.40 Notably, 
the Directive’s right of access has generally not been interpreted as granting a right to 
explanation of specific decisions already reached, as it is not part of the safeguards at the time 
automated decisions are made in Article 15(2)a of the Directive; this distinction is comparable 
to the difference between Articles 15 and 22 of the GDPR. The Directive names only one 
safeguard against automated decision-making, namely the right for the data subject to “put his 
point of view.” A right to explanation of specific decisions as a safeguard to ensure lawful 
automated decision-making was not envisaged. 
The implementation and interpretation of the Directive’s right of access varied across 
the Member States. Despite much debate,41 consensus has not emerged concerning the type of 
information data controllers must disclose to provide data subjects with “knowledge of the 
logic involved in any automatic processing of data” per Article 12(a).42 A report published in 
                                                 
 
38 C-141/12 and C-372/12 [2014] European Court of Justice ECLI:EU:C:2014:2081. 
39 Douwe Korff, ‘New Challenges to Data Protection Study - Working Paper No. 2: Data Protection Laws in the 
EU: The Difficulties in Meeting the Challenges Posed by Global Social and Technical Developments’ (European 
Commission DG Justice, Freedom and Security 2010) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1638949> accessed 8 December 2016. 
40 See Recital 41 of the Directive “Whereas any person must be able to exercise the right of access to data relating 
to him which are being processed, in order to verify in particular the accuracy of the data and the lawfulness of 
the processing…” See also: Paal (n 33) Rn. 19-22, who notes that the general purpose of the right of access 
according to Article 15 GDPR is the realisation of the so called “two step model.” In a first step data subjects have 
to right to a) know if is data being processed and b) if so, what data is used and in some cases data controllers 
have to provide additional information (such as the logic involved in automated processing). 
41 See for instance debate in the UK House of Lords concerning the meaning of “logic involved” and “trade 
secrets” in the 1998 Data Protection Act: Grand Committee on the Data Protection Bill, ‘Official Report of the 
Grand Committee on the Data Protection Bill [H.L.] (Hansard, 23 February 1998)’ (UK Parliament - House of 
Lords 1998) <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/grand_committee_report/1998/feb/23/official-report-of-the-
grand-committee#S5LV0586P0_19980223_GCR_1> accessed 15 December 2016. See also Philip Coppel, 
Information Rights: Law and Practice (Bloomsbury Publishing 2014) Chapter 5 Section 3 which discusses how 
trade secrets limit the right of access and to know about the logic involved in automated processing, and provides 
an overview of the right of access as implemented by Member States. 
42 As an example, Council of Europe, ‘The Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data in the Context of Profiling’ (Council of Europe 2010) Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)13 138 
argues that the right of access in Article 12 of the Directive equates to a right to be informed, not a right to an 
explanation of a decision reached: “Principle 5.1 states that the data subject should be entitled to know about the 
personal data concerning him or her and the logic which served as a basis for the profiling. It is indeed essential 
that a data subject exercising the right of access should be informed of the statistical method and inferences used 





2010 on the implementation of the Directive across Member States suggested that it was left to 
the Member States to define the scope and requirements of the right of access. The report urges 
clarification of the requirements and limitations on the right of access concerning information 
about the “logic involved” due to the growing importance of automated decisions.43 In part, the 
lack of consensus over the meaning and requirements of “logic involved” owes to the relative 
lack of jurisprudence on the right of access. Despite the Directive having been in force for over 
20 years, the requirements and limitations of the right of access applied to automated decision-
making have not been extensively clarified or tested in courts across Europe.44  
The limited jurisprudence available reveals limitations on the Directive’s right of 
access. Several overriding interests and exceptions have been identified that significantly limit 
both the scope of applicability and content of the explanation. In general, data subjects are 
entitled to receive some information about the general functionality of an automated decision-
making system, but little to no information about the rationale or circumstances of a specific 
decision. The 2010 report reflects this, noting that the language used in the Directive reflects a 
very narrow scope of applicability for the right of access due to a number of exceptions and 
limiting or overriding interests.45 Recital 41 of the Directive clarifies that the right of access 
can be limited by trade secrets and intellectual property, especially relating to software.46 These 
interests have proven strong limiting factors on the right of access as implemented and tested 
by Member States. 
Several examples can be offered. French data protection law47 grants data subjects a 
right to receive information about the “logic involved” as long as it does not contravene 
copyright regulations. To allow data subjects to challenge decisions, information must be 
provided about the general logic and types of data taken into account, “but not (or at least not 
                                                 
 
for his or her profiling, the logic underpinning the processing and the envisaged consequences of the profile’s 
attribution” [italics added]. 
43 Korff, ‘New Challenges to Data Protection Study-Working Paper No. 2’ (n 39) 86. 
44 ibid 85. 
45 ibid 86. 
46 Note that Recital 41 of the Directive also states in relation to trade secrets that “these considerations must not, 
however, result in the data subject being refused all information” [italics added]. See also: Lee A Bygrave, 
‘Automated Profiling: Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data Protection Directive and Automated 
Profiling’ (2001) 17 Computer Law & Security Review 17. The author notes that Articles 12 and 15(1) considered 
together suggest that the data controller must understand and document the logic involved in an automated 
decision, including the categories of data considered, and their role in the decision-making process. However, the 
extent to which this information must be given to the data subject can be limited by overriding interests of the 
controller, including trade secrets. 
47 Korff, ‘New Challenges to Data Protection Study-Working Paper No. 2’ (n 39) 86. 





fully) of the weight that is attached” to specific features.48 The full code of the automated 
decision-making system or algorithm does not need to be revealed.49 A similar approach is 
taken in the UK’s Data Protection Act 1998, which also limits the right of access to protect 
trade secrets.50 As with French law, data controllers  
must inform data subjects of the factors which they take into account in the “evaluation” 
underlying the decision, but without having to reveal the exact weight given to each of 
these factors (i.e. the copyright-protected algorithm used in the automated decision-
taking process).51 
 
German data protection law has similarly recognised a distinction between explanations of 
system functionality and specific automated decisions in §6(a) of the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, 
which jointly implements Articles 12 (right of access) and 15 (safeguards for automated 
individual decisions) of the Directive.52 Notably, Germany implemented a right allowing data 
                                                 
 
48 Douwe Korff, ‘New Challenges to Data Protection Study - Country Report: France’ (European Commission 
DG Justice, Freedom and Security 2010) 27 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1638955> accessed 15 December 
2016. 
49 ibid. 
50 Article 8(5) of the UK Data Protection Act 1998 states that “Section 7(1)(d) is not to be regarded as requiring 
the provision of information as to the logic involved in any decision-taking if, and to the extent that, the 
information constitutes a trade secret” [italics added]. 
51 Douwe Korff, ‘New Challenges to Data Protection Study - Country Report: United Kingdom’ (European 
Commission DG Justice, Freedom and Security 2010) 48 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1638938> accessed 15 December 2016. 
52 Concerning how an explanation is required both as a safeguard against automated decision-making and 
through the right of access, see: Douwe Korff, ‘New Challenges to Data Protection Study - Country Report: 
Germany’ (European Commission DG Justice, Freedom and Security 2010) 27 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/studies/files/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_country_report_a4_germany.pdf> 
accessed 15 December 2016.  
Concerning § 6(a)2(2) right to explanation: Kai von Lewinski, ‘BDSG § 6a Automatisierte Einzelentscheidung’ 
in Wolff and Brink (eds), Beck’scher Online-Kommentar Datenschutzrecht (17th edn, beck-online 2016) Rn. 
45-49; ibid Rn. 47-48.1 states the required explanation can be short and must only include the main reason for 
the decision. The data subject must be able to understand why a decision has not been made in her favour. 
For discussion of § 6(a)3 (the extended right of access and its limitations due to trade secrets), see: Peter Gola, 
Christoph Klug and Barbara Körffer, ‘BDSG § 6a Automatisierte Einzelentscheidung’ in Gola and Schomerus 
(eds), Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (12th edn, 2015) Rn. 18-19. Lewinski Rn. 50-53 commenting on § 6(a)3 (the 
extended right of access) explains that the data subject needs to have a basis to evaluate that an automated 
decision is accurate. This suggests that there is a least some basis to obtain an explanation after the decision has 
been made under the extended right of access. However, it is noted that trade secrets restrict this right: only the 
basis of decision parameters have to be disclosed, but not details of the parameters. The “logical structure” must 
be disclosed, which refers to the “decision tree”, but not the software or the code. ibid Rn. 47-48.1 also notes 
that the scope (the extent to which information must be disclosed) of the right of access and the safeguards in § 
6(a)2 are comparable.  
On safeguards in § 6, Gola, Klug and Körffer Rn. 1-20, commenting on§6(a), explains a right to explanation is 
granted under § 6(a)2(2), which is one of the safeguards relating to the second exemption of the general 
prohibition of automated decision-making. Safeguards in this article require the data controller to inform about 
how the decision was reached (3 step model: to be informed about the fact that such a decision was taken and, 
upon request of the data subject, to receive an explanation of the decision reached and the right to contest the 
decision). For a discussion, see: ibid Rn. 12-14c. The first exception under § 6(a)2(1) (performance of a contract 





subject’s to request an explanation of automated decisions that are not made in their favour. 
The right is implemented as an explicit safeguard against automated decisions in §6(a)2(2) of 
the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz. The right was voluntarily enacted as a safeguard beyond the 
requirements set in Article 15 of the Directive, which grants the right to express views as the 
only safeguard against automated individual decisions. Interestingly, the right to an explanation 
as an extra safeguard provides some insight into how the Directive’s requirement to explain 
the “logic involved” was interpreted by German legislators. §6(a)3 of the German Data 
Protection Act separately extends the right of access enshrined in §19 and §34, allowing data 
subjects to obtain information about the “logical structure” of automated processing, which 
refers back to Article 12(a) of the Directive.53 If “knowledge of logic involved” in Article 12(a) 
was intended to establish a right to obtain an explanation about decisions reached, it would not 
have been necessary for German legislators to enact separately a right to explanation 
(§6(a)2(2)) in the same Article containing the extended right of access (§6(a)3), especially 
considering both rights must be invoked by the data subject. Even if one wishes to argue that 
§6(a)2(2) and §6(a)3 refer to the same type of explanation (i.e. of specific decisions), the use 
of different wording across the articles – “main reasons for the decision and have it explained” 
in §6(a)2(2), “logical structure of the automated processing of the data that concerns [the data 
subject]” [our translation] in §6(a)3) – suggests that the two mechanisms entitle the data subject 
to different types of information.54  
                                                 
 
and if the decision has been made in favour of the data subject) does not explicitly require an explanation 
(unlike § 6(a)2(2)). Rather, the right of access in § 6(a)3 will apply in these cases which, per above, could be 
interpreted as a right to obtain an explanation after the decision has been made. The phrasing of § 6(a)3 
(extended right of access) can be interpreted both ways: as granting an explanation both before and after a 
decision has been made; see: Lewinski Rn. 1-4. Further, the SCHUFA judgments (see: Section 3.3.1) show that 
judges interpreted the right of access to grant a limited right to obtain an explanation after a decision has been 
made; see: ibid Rn. 50-51.  
For further discussion of the overlap of automated decision-making under § 6a and scoring provisions under § 
28b see: Gola, Klug and Körffer Rn 6-7, 15-17. Note that the German commentators mentioned do not see a 
difference between § 6(a)2 right to explanation and § 6(a)3 right of access when discussing the limitations 
imposed by trade secrets on information given to the data subject. See also: Lewinski Rn. 1-4; Gola, Klug and 
Körffer Rn. 14-14a.  
53 Philip Scholz, ‘BDSG § 6a Automatisierte Einzelentscheidung’ in Simitis (ed), Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (8th 
edn, 2014) Rn. 38.  
54 Lewinski (n 52) Rn. 50-52 states that the wording of the German Data Protection Act is not clear regarding 
whether the right of access refers to information about the “process” (meaning the system) or “a decision made.” 





Following this, German legal commentary and jurisprudence55 addressing the extended 
right of access (§6(a)3) suggest that the information it requires is limited mostly to system 
functionality. The data controller does not need to disclose the software used, as the software 
is considered to be a trade secret.56 Some German commentators believe that some (or the “top 
four”) features factored into a decision have to be disclosed, but not the algorithm used due to 
trade secrets.57 Data controllers are not obligated to explain how the software is working or, 
especially, to give any details about its code. The data controller is only obligated to explain 
the logic of the “decision tree.” The “weighting” [our translation] of specific features and the 
parameters used to make the decision do not have to be disclosed. This is meant to protect trade 
secrets and manipulation of the decision-making system.58 
This interpretation of the right of access as being limited to system functionality in 
order not to contravene trade secrets is also reflected in German jurisprudence. According to 
several commentators,59 the German SCHUFA60 judgments61 show that data subjects do not 
have a right to investigate fully the accuracy of automated processing systems (in this case, 
credit scoring), as the underlying formulas are protected as trade secrets. The protected formula 
would consist of, for example, statistical values, weighting of certain elements to calculate 
probabilities (e.g. the likelihood of loan repayment), and reference or comparison groups. 
                                                 
 
55 BGH: kein umfassender Auskunftsanspruch gegen SCHUFA 2014 (VI ZR 156/13) BDSG § 34 Abs. 4; Mario 
Martini, ‘Big Data als Herausforderung für den Persönlichkeitsschutz und das Datenschutzrecht’ [2014] DVBI 
1481. 
56 Gola, Klug and Körffer (n 52) Rn. 18-19 “Über die allgemeinen Auskunftsansprüche nach § 19 bzw. § 34 sind 
nach Absatz 3 auch Angaben zu machen über den logischen Aufbau der automatisierten Verarbeitung. Dem 
Betroffenen soll in erster Linie veranschaulicht werden, was mit seinen Daten geschieht. Er soll in die Lage 
versetzt werden, Gesichtspunkte vorzubringen, die inhaltliche Überprüfung der automatisiert vorgenommen 
„vermuteten“ Bewertung ermöglichen. Unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Schutzes von Geschäftsgeheimnissen und 
des Urheberrechtsschutzes umfasst die Auskunftspflicht jedoch nicht die verwendete Software (zur sog. 
Scoreformel als Geschäftsgeheimnis vgl. BGH, NJW 2014, 1235, der die Frage der Reichweite des 
Auskunftsanspruchs über den logischen Aufbau der automatisierten Verarbeitung mangels Vorliegens einer 
automatisierten Einzelentscheidung dahinstehen ließ).“ 
57 Korff, ‘New Challenges to Data Protection Study-Country Report’ (n 52) 27 ff. 
58 Lewinski (n 52) Rn. 50-53  
59 Bräutigam and Schmidt-Wudy (n 36) 62; Jens Hammersen and Ulrich Eisenried, ‘Ist „Redlining” in 
Deutschland erlaubt? Plädoyer für eine weite Auslegung des Auskunftsanspruchs’ [2014] ZD Zeitschrift für 
Datenschutz 342. 
60 Amongst others, judgment of the German Federal Court BGH, ZD 2014, 306. It is important to note that the 
German court refused to talk about the extent to which the data subject is entitled to know about the logic involved 
as the Court ruled that in this case there was no automated decision, as explained in: Gola, Klug and Körffer (n 
52) Rn. 18-19.  
61 Judgment of the German Federal Court Bundesgerichtshof 28.01.2014 – VI ZR 156/13. Also. LG Giessen. 
06.03.2013 – 1 S 301/12. Also, AG Giessen 11.10.2014 – 47 C 206/12. 





The judgments indicate that all three elements of the right of access enshrined in Article 
12(a) of the Directive aim to provide general information about the usage and purpose of data 
processing. Concrete elements of the screening procedures do not have to be disclosed.62 The 
data subject is entitled to know which data and features were taken into account when the 
decision was made, in order to be able to contest the decision or demand that inaccurate or 
incomplete data be rectified. However, the weighting of these elements, the method (scoring 
formula), the statistical values, and the information about the reference groups63 used does not 
have to be disclosed.64 The judgments state that jurisprudence, academic literature, and legal 
commentary commonly agree that the abstract methods used to define credit scores do not have 
to be disclosed, and that this position is in accordance with the intention of German data 
protection legislation.65  
It is worth noting that the SCHUFA judgments do not explicitly address automated 
decision-making, as the court decided an automated decision was not made because automated 
processing was only used for preparation of evidence, while the actual decision was made by 
a human being.66 The judgments are nonetheless insightful insofar as they demonstrate a strong 
tendency to protect trade secrets in relation to the right of access. As discussed below, this case 
provides an example of an important limitation on a right to explanation established on any of 
the three legal bases in the GDPR identified above. Automated decision-making is defined in 
both the Directive and GDPR as decision-making based solely on automated processes.67 Quite 
crucially, this creates a loophole whereby even nominal involvement of a human in the 
                                                 
 
62 Judgment of the German Federal Court: Scoring und Datenschutz BGH, 28. 1. 2014 - VI ZR 156/13 (LG Gießen, 
AG Gießen) p. 169. 
63 ‘Reference groups’ refer to profiles or classifications that inform the assessment of creditworthiness. For a 
discussion, see for instance: Mittelstadt and others (n 7); Mireille Hildebrandt and Serge Gutwirth, Profiling the 
European Citizen (Springer 2008). 
64 Judgment of the German Federal Court : BGH: Umfang einer von der SCHUFA zu erteilenden Auskunft  BGH, 
Urteil vom 28.1.2014 - VI ZR 156/13 (LG Gießen, AG Gießen) p. 490. The judgments show that the right of 
access is very limited. 
65 The court, however, acknowledged that there is discussion about whether or not information about the weighting 
of features and reference groups should be included in disclosures, and to what extent. 
66 Reflecting this, the court subsequently refused to discuss the extent to which the logic involved needed to be 
disclosed by the data controller. Rather, it addressed the general obligation of data controllers to provide 
information about the data being processed, derived from the right of access. 
67 Article 15(1) of the Directive defines ‘automated individual decisions’ as "a decision which produces legal 
effects concerning him or significantly affects him and which is based solely on automated processing of data 
intended to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to him, such as his performance at work, creditworthiness, 
reliability, conduct, etc.” Similarly, Article 22(1) GDPR defines ‘automated decision-making’ as “a decision 
based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or 
similarly significantly affects him or her.” 





decision-making process allows for an otherwise automated mechanism to avoid invoking 
elements of the right of access (both in the Directive and GDPR) addressing automated 
decisions.  
Finally, Austrian legislators similarly implemented the requirements of Article 12a and 
15 of the Directive in § 49(3)68 of the Austrian Data Protection Act. As opposed to German 
law, the right to obtain an explanation about how an individual decision was reached was not 
implemented as a safeguard. Only the right to express one’s view is named as one of the 
mandatory safeguards, as mandated by Article 15 of the Directive. §49(3) establishes an 
extended right of access (§26) which is the data subject’s right to know, upon request, about 
the logic of the process of automated decision-making.69  
Austrian jurisprudence70 is very vague on the right of access and automated decision-
making. Existing decisions do not fully explain how much the data controller is obligated to 
disclose under the right of access, and are in some sense contradictory. In most decisions, an 
obligation was recognised to explain how the system in questions functions.71 In contrast, one 
decision stated that the right of access according to §26 and the right to know about the logic 
of the process (§49(3)) also includes the criteria and the weighting of the criteria which would 
then allow the data subject to understand how a decision was reached. However, the Austrian 
Data Protection Commission simultaneously acknowledged that trade secrets can limit this 
right. The Commission concluded that the extent to which the data controller needs to disclose 
                                                 
 
68 Bundesgesetz über den Schutz personenbezogener Daten (Datenschutzgesetz 2000  - DSG 2000) 2000 (DSG 
2000) 49 Abs (3). - “Dem Betroffenen ist bei automatisierten Einzelentscheidungen auf Antrag der logische 
Ablauf der automatisierten Entscheidungsfindung in allgemein verständlicher Form darzulegen. § 26 Abs. 2 bis 
10 gilt sinngemäß.” 
69 Decision of the Austrian Data Protection Commission 24.04.2009, app. nr. K121.461/0003-DSK/2009. 
70 Amongst others, Decisions of the Austrian Data Protection Commission: 24.04.2009 app. nr. K121.461/0003-
DSK/2009, addressing the need to explain the system used; 27.08.2010 - app. nr. K121.599/0014-DSK/2010; 
22.05.2013- app. nr. K121.935/0006-DSK/2013; 25.04.2008 - app. nr. 121.348/0007-DSK/2008, addressing the 
need to explain the system used; 08.05.2009 - app. nr. K121.470/0007-DSK/2009, addressing whether a process 
counts as an automated decision; 20.03.2009 - app. nr. K121.467/0007-DSK/2009; 25.04.2008- app. nr. 
K121.348/0007-DSK/2008; 25.04.2008 - app. nr. K121.348/0007-DSK/2008; 25.05.2012 - app. nr. 
K121.791/0008-DSK/2012; 9.06.2009 - app. nr. K121.460/0008-DSK/2009; 19.06.2009 - app. nr. 
K121.494/0013-DSK/2009; 02.02.2007 - app. nr. K121.238/0006-DSK/2007; Austrian Administrative Court 
judgments 11.12.2009- 2 app. nr. 009/17/0223; 15.11.2012- app. nr. 2008/17/0096; 20.02.2008- app. nr. 
2005/15/0161.  
71 According to a decision of the Austrian Data Protection Commission 25.04.2008- app. nr. K121.348/0007-
DSK/2008, the obligation is with the data controller to inform about the procedure of automated decision-making 
in an understandable manner: “die Pflicht, dem Betroffenen den Ablauf der automatisierten Entscheidungsfindung 
in allgemein verständlicher Form darzulegen.” 





decision criteria and weighting must be determined on a case by case basis.72 In another case, 
the Commission denied the existence of an individual automated decision because the criteria 
used were based on a large group rather than on the individual. Therefore, the rights of access 
and to know about the logic of automated processing do not apply, if the basis of that decision 
is a group (“peer group” [our translation]) rather than (data about) the individual.73 This 
distinction highlights a tension in the definition of automated decision-making and profiling in 
the Directive, insofar as automated processing of data describing groups, rather than 
individuals, does not allow for invocation of the right of access.74 
3.3.2 From the Directive to the GDPR: the right to be informed 
The Directive’s right of access provides an explanation of the system’s functionality which has 
been heavily limited by trade secrets. The loophole – through which automated processes that 
merely produce evidence for decision-making (rather than actually making decisions) are not 
subject to the right of access (specifically, the provision to disclose information about the “logic 
involved”) – has also proven to be a significant limiting factor. A relative lack of jurisprudence 
across Member States has not helped clarify and unify the requirements. This is problematic 
given the current and emerging growth in automated decision-making and data processing.  
The GDPR appears to offer less protection to data subjects concerning explanations of 
automated decision-making than some current data protection laws in Europe based on the 
Directive.75 In particular, the GDPR’s right of access appears to not offer more protection for 
                                                 
 
72 Decision of the Austrian Data Protection Commission 12.12.2007 app. nr. K121.313/0016-DSK/2007. See also 
12.12.2007 app. nr. K121.313/0016-DSK/2007. It is important to note that in the latter decision the Commission 
talked about a hypothetical obligation of the data controller, since the applicant did not lodge a request under § 
49(3) but rather invoked his general right of access under § 26. The Commission stated that if the data subject had 
lodged a complaint under § 49(3), the data controller would need to disclose this information, but how far trade 
secrets would limit the disclosure would need to be examined on a case to case basis, therefore there is no 
precedent yet. 
73 In this decision it was found that there is no automated decision because the decision was based on a group 
(“peer group”) rather than the individual and it was stated that such an automated decision (marketing purposes) 
would not have enough significant effects and consequences to have § 49 (3) apply; see: Decision of the Austrian 
Data Protection Commission 10.03.2016 app. nr. DSB-D122.322/0001-DSB/2016. 
74 This loophole points towards the need to recognise some type of group privacy right in data protection law, as 
processing of identifiable data is not required to learn about and take actions towards an individual. For further 
discussion, see: Mittelstadt and others (n 7); Brent Mittelstadt, ‘From Individual to Group Privacy in Big Data 
Analytics’ [2017] Philosophy & Technology; Linnet Taylor, Luciano Floridi and Bart van der Sloot (eds), Group 
Privacy: New Challenges of Data Technologies (1st edn, Springer 2017); Alessandro Mantelero, ‘Personal Data 
for Decisional Purposes in the Age of Analytics: From an Individual to a Collective Dimension of Data Protection’ 
(2016) 32 Computer Law & Security Review 238; Lee A Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching Its 
Rationale, Logic and Limits (Kluwer Law Intl 2002) ch 15.   
75 Martini (n 35) Rn. 42-44 explains how other provisions of the GDPR fall behind and weaken the current data 
protection standards, e.g. in terms of contractual relations as a legitimate reason for automated decisions, in that 





data subjects’ interests than the Directive’s right of access.76 The use of future-oriented 
semantics in the GDPR (unlike the Directive which did not explicitly acknowledge a decision-
making timeline), as well as its terminological overlap with notification duties, suggest that the 
GDPR intends to further limit the right of access regarding automated decision-making to 
explanations of system functionality.77 The phrasing of Article 15 GDPR in particular points 
towards a general explanation of the existence and functionality of automated decision-making 
systems. Article 12(a) of the Directive grants data subjects a right to obtain “knowledge of the 
logic involved in any automatic processing of data concerning him at least in the case of the 
automated decisions referred to in Article 15 ( 1 ).”78 It is interesting to note that this phrase is 
open to greater interpretation than Article 15 GDPR, 79 which requires only information about 
“the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) 
and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as 
the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject”.  As 
argued above, this phrase in the GDPR requires that the data subject be informed merely about 
the usage and functionality of automated decision-making methods. The change of wording 
indicates that the intention of the right of access in the GDPR is to grant access to information 
about the “usage” and functionality of such automated decision-making. Again, this suggests 
an even stronger intention to limit the right to explanations of system functionality, not the 
rationale and circumstances of specific decisions.  
                                                 
 
regards see also Alexander Roßnagel, Philipp Richter and Maxi Nebel, ‘Besserer Internetdatenschutz für 
Europa. Vorschläge Zur Spezifizierung Der DS-GVO’ (2013) 3 Zeitschrift für Datenschutz 103. 
76 Hammersen and Eisenried (n 59), commenting on the EC’s original 2012 draft, note that the interpretation of 
the Directive’s right of access through jurisprudence suggests that the right grants a very weak type of explanation 
of automated processing of data. The data subject is not provided a basis to scrutinize the outcome of automated 
processing of data, including the method or algorithm used, or reference groups. The GDPR has not strengthened 
the right of access compared to the Directive in any notable way, meaning similar limitations are likely to apply. 
77 The Directive’s right of access does not refer to the future, or use identical language to notification duties. The 
latter point is unremarkable, as the Directive did not contain notification duties. We can thus only discuss whether 
a right to explanation of system functionality or specific decisions was derived by Member States from the right 
of access in Article 12 of the Directive, as opposed to ex ante or ex post explanations. 
78
  Recital 41 of the Directive makes a similar claim.  
79 The right of access only exists if the data controller has personal data of the data subjects, see: Mireille 
Hildebrandt, ‘The Dawn of a Critical Transparency Right for the Profiling Era’, Digital Enlightenment Yearbook 
2012 (IOS Press 2012). Further, the right of access is limited as far as data of other data subjects are concerned, 
see: Mireille Hildebrandt and Serge Gutwirth (n 63). 





Legal scholars are already debating the scope of the right of access in the GDPR. 
According to German commentary80 on the GDPR, it is sufficient to be informed about the 
envisaged consequences in a very simple manner. For instance, an explanation of how a low 
rating of creditworthiness can affect the choice of payment options would be sufficient.81 The 
type of explanation recognised in prior German jurisprudence82 and German commentary on 
the GDPR83 is limited by overriding interests of the data controller, e.g. protection of trade 
secrets, or prevention of ‘gaming the system’ by users. The process that the algorithms use 
does not have to be disclosed.84 Furthermore, the rating of similar groups has historically not 
needed to be disclosed.85   
These recent commentaries on the GDPR follow the general interpretation and prior 
jurisprudence on the right of access in the 1995 Directive. According to commentators, data 
controllers do not need to explain fully the rationale and circumstances of a specific decision 
to provide data subjects with “meaningful information about the logic involved” (Article 
15(1)h GDPR). Rather, the information offered by data controllers will address general system 
functionality, and could be heavily curtailed to protect the controller’s interests (e.g. trade 
secrets, intellectual property).86 It is worth noting that additional limitations can also be 
imposed to protect the interests of other parties via Union or Member State law.87 Paal also 
notes that the purpose of Article 15 GDPR is to allow data subjects to be informed about the 
usage and functionality of automated decision-making. As the scope of information data 
controllers are required to disclose in Article 15 is the same as in Article 13, Article 15 similarly 
requires only limited information about the functionality of the automated decision-making 
system. Paal also notes that “meaningful information” does not create an obligation to disclose 
                                                 
 
80 Paal, ‘DS-GVO Art. 13 Informationspflicht bei Erhebung von Personenbezogenen Daten bei der Betroffenen 
Person’ in Paal and Pauly (eds), Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (1st edn, beck-online 2017); Martini (n 35) Rn. 
42-44. 
81 Paal (n 80). 
82 BGH, 2812014 - VI ZR 156/13 - BGH: Umfang einer von der SCHUFA zu erteilenden Auskunft Rn 489-494 
[2014] BGH VI ZR 156/13, 2014 MMR Rn. 494; Bräutigam and Schmidt-Wudy (n 36) 61. 
83 Paal (n 80). 
84 ibid. 
85 BGH (n 55). 
86 Recitals 47 and 63 GDPR address protection of the interests of data controllers. Recital 63 notes, in relation to 
the right of access, “That right should not adversely affect the rights or freedoms of others, including trade secrets 
or intellectual property and in particular the copyright protecting the software.” 
87 Article 23(1) GDPR addresses possible further limitations on obligations and rights under Articles 12-22, 
including the right of access; Article 89(2) similarly allows for limitations on rights and obligations for processing 
for scientific or historical research or statistical purposes. Finally, Article 89(3) address limitations for processing 
for archiving purposes or in the public interest. 





the algorithm, but only to provide basic information about its logic. Schmidt-Wudy argues that 
if necessary to assess the accuracy of data processing, information about the algorithm could 
be given, with appropriate limitations to protect trade secrets.88  However, the type of 
information to be provided is not specified. 
As with the Directive, the practical requirements and utility of the GDPR’s right of 
access will similarly only be revealed through testing and clarification via jurisprudence and 
expert opinion, such as from the Article 29 Working Party, the new European Data Protection 
Board established by Article 68 GDPR,89 the European Data Protection Supervisor, or its Ethics 
Advisory Group90 (see Section 5). However, the implementation of the Directive’s right of 
access strongly suggests that the GDPR’s right of access will be far from the ex post ‘general’ 
right to explanation of system functionality and specific decisions, which we have argued it is 
mistakenly attributed to the GDPR. Rather, through the right of access, the GDPR will grant a 
‘right to be informed’ about the existence of automated decision-making and system 
functionality, limited in applicability along the lines above and those described in the following 
section.  
 
4 What if a right to explanation were granted? 
Although a meaningful right to explanation of specific automated decisions will not be 
introduced by the GDPR, the contribution of such a right to the accountability and transparency 
of automated decision-making may provide compelling reasons for legislators or data 
                                                 
 
88 On “meaningful information” and Article 13, see: Paal (n 33) Rn. 19-22. The general purpose of the right of 
access according to Article 15 GDPR is the realisation of the so called “two step model.” In a first step data 
subjects have the right to a) know if their data is being processed and b) if so, what data are used. In some cases 
data controllers have to provide additional information (such as the logic involved in processing). Further, ibid 
Rn. 31 the author suggests that the content and scope of the disclosure according to Article 13 is the same as in 
Article 15. The authors cite Bräutigam and Schmidt-Wudy (n 36) in discussing the scope of Article 13 GDPR as 
one of the sources to limit the data controller’s obligations under Article 15. This suggests that Articles 13 and 15 
GDPR do not differ in the obligation of the data controllers to disclose information. See also: Paal (n 80) Rn. 31-
33. On disclosure of the algorithm, see: Paal Paal/Pauly, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, DS-GVO Art. 13 
Informationspflicht bei Erhebung von personenbezogenen Daten bei der betroffenen Person, Rn. 31 -32. On the 
necessity of disclosure to verify accuracy, see: Schmidt-Wudy in Beck'scher Online-Kommentar 
Datenschutzrecht, Wolff/Brink 19. Edition, DS-GVO Artikel 15 Auskunftsrecht der betroffenen Person, Rn. 76-
80 
89  The Board fills a similar role to the Article 29 Working Party established by the Directive. Interestingly, the 
Board has explicitly been called upon in Article 70(1)f to “issue guidelines, recommendations and best 
practices…for further specifying the criteria and conditions for decisions based on profiling pursuant to Article 
22(2).” In doing so, the GDPR is implicitly acknowledging that the applicability of the three cases specified in 
Article 22(2) (contract, Union or Member State law, or consent) remains an open issue. 
90 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Ethics Advisory Group’ (2015) 
<https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/EDPS/Ethics> accessed 8 March 2017. 





controllers to introduce one in the future. It is possible to envisage at least four main scenarios 
that may lead to a right of explanation of specific automated decisions in practice: 
1. An additional legal requirement is enacted by Member States, separate from the GDPR, 
granting a right of explanation of specific decisions (similar to actions taken by German 
legislators under the 1995 Directive) (see also Section 5). 
2. Based on GDPR Article 22 and Recital 71, data controllers voluntary choose to offer a 
right to explanation of specific decisions as a “suitable […] safeguard”. The right would 
be an additional and voluntary safeguard to those already required by Article 22(3). 
Controllers could do this on the basis that an explanation is required to invoke one of 
the three legally required Article 22(3) safeguards, i.e., express their views, obtain 
human intervention, or contest a decision. 
3. Future jurisprudence broadly interprets the safeguards against automated decision-
making (Article 22(3)) to establish a right to explanation of specific decisions. This 
could occur, for example, on the basis that an explanation of the rationale of an 
automated decision is required in order to contest it or express views. Future guidelines 
of the European Data Protection Board could support this interpretation.  
4. Future jurisprudence establishes that the right of access (Article 15 GDPR) provides a 
basis for explanations of specific automated decisions, as a requirement to provide 
information about the “existence of […] logic involved […] significance […] [or] 
envisaged consequences” of automated decision-making (Article 15(h)1). This 
interpretation could also be supported in future guidelines of the European Data 
Protection Board.  
 
Of these scenarios, the third and fourth seem to be the most plausible at the moment.  
Concerning the third, Article 22(3) guarantees that human intervention is available for 
automated decisions rendered in fulfilment of a contract or with explicit consent (see below). 
On this basis, one may argue that, although it is certainly not explicit in the phrasing of Article 
22(3), the right to obtain human intervention, express views or contest a decision is 
meaningless if the data subject cannot understand how the contested decision was taken. The 
right to contest has already been interpreted by Member States, in enacting the 1995 Directive, 
as merely a right to force a controller to make a new decision. This interpretation is found in 
the UK Data Protection Act 1998 (Article 12(2)b): subjects can demand a new decision to be 
made, albeit without any way to assess the reliability of the old decision. A broad reading of 





Article 22(3), according to which an explanation is required to contest a decision, would 
strengthen the right to contest. In this case, the argument for a right to explanation of specific 
decisions could be further buttressed by drawing on the rights to fair trial and effective remedy 
enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 47 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Without an explanation of how the 
algorithm works, both rights are hard to enforce, because the decisions/evidence used will be 
impossible to contest in court.91     
 Concerning the fourth option, implementation of the right of access in the 1995 
Directive has shown the need for interpretation of vague provisions by Member States and 
national courts. As noted above, consensus has not emerged over the meaning or requirements 
implied for data controllers when explaining the “logic involved” in automated individual 
decisions. Austrian jurisprudence has demonstrated that the scope of “logic involved” is 
sufficiently broad to include that some elements of the rationale or circumstances of a specific 
decision be explained along with system functionality, albeit limited severely by data 
controller’s interests (e.g. trade secrets). Despite aiming to unify data protection law across the 
Member States, the GDPR’s right of access will need to be similarly interpreted and tested. 
Given that the reference to “logic involved” occurs in both the Directive and GDPR, it is 
plausible (but unlikely) that future legal interpretation of the right of access could establish a 
right to explanation of specific decisions. 
   
4.1 Limitations on a right to explanation derived from the right of access (Article 15) 
or safeguards against automated decision-making (Article 22(3)) 
Assuming one or indeed a combination of the previous four scenarios occurs, and hence that a 
right to explanation of specific decisions is granted, other provisions in the GDPR may still 
limit its scope significantly. A ‘general’ right to explanation as proposed elsewhere (see Section 
1), seemingly applicable to all types of automated processing, would not exist. A primary 
limitation is the narrow definition of automated decision-making in Article 22(1),92 defined as  
                                                 
 
91 Tal Zarsky, ‘Transparent Predictions’ (2013) 2013 University of Illinois Law Review 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2324240> accessed 17 June 2016. A right to contest 
realised through expert human intervention may be the most pragmatic safeguard against automated decisions. 
Elsewhere it has been argued that transparency disclosures prove more impactful if tailored towards trained third 
parties or regulators as opposed to data subjects themselves. 
92 Bygrave (n 46)  discusses comparable limitations on the definition of ‘automated individual decisions’ in the 
1995 Directive. 





a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces 
legal effects concerning [the data subject] or similarly significantly affects him or her. 
  
An automated process must meet this definition for Articles 15(1)h (right of access) or 22(3) 
to apply, and thus for a future right to explanation established on either basis to be invoked.  
Automated decision-making must have “legal or other significant effects,” with a 
decision based “solely on automated processing of data” (Article 22(1)). The latter requirement 
opens a loophole whereby any human involvement in a decision-making process could mean 
it is not ‘automated decision-making’.93 While the required level of human involvement is not 
clear in practice, the phrase ‘solely’ suggests even some nominal human involvement may be 
sufficient. There is still uncertainty as to whether the usage of automated processing for the 
preparation of a decision ultimately acted upon by a human constitutes a decision “solely based 
on automated processing,” if the human does not interfere, verify, or modify the decision or 
decision-making rationale.94 Preparation of evidence for a decision, and making the decision 
itself, are not necessarily equivalent acts.95 Martini believes that automated processing of data 
for “assistance to make a decision” or “preparation of a decision” is not within the scope of 
Article 22.96 Decisions based predominantly on automated processes, but with nominal human 
involvement, would thus not invoke Article 15(1)h (right of access) or Article 22(3) 
(safeguards against automated decision-making), and thus would not require an explanation of 
system functionality or the rationale of specific decisions, assuming that such a right to 
explanation of specific decisions was established on either basis.97 
Interpretation of Article 15 of the Directive, which was also limited to decisions “based 
solely on automated data processing,” does not provide clarification. The strict reading of 
‘solely’ by Martini was reflected in the SCHUFA judgments already discussed (see: Section 
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3.3.1). In contrast, Bygrave argues that a relative notion of ‘solely’ is required for the phrase 
to be meaningful. According to this position, decisions formally attributed to humans, but 
originating “from an automated data-processing operation the result of which is not actively 
assessed by either that person or other persons before being formalised as a decision,” would 
fall under the scope of ‘automated decision-making’.98 It is not clear how this provision in the 
GDPR will be interpreted in the future.  
The scope of data processing to which Article 22 (and Recital 71) applies was narrowed 
in the adopted version of the GDPR compared to prior drafts. The phrase “a decision based 
solely on automated processing” proved a point of contention between the EC and EP drafts. 
Article 20(5) of the EP’s proposed amendments99 to the EC’s draft100 adds the phrase 
‘predominantly’ to the measures to which the Article would apply (“Profiling which leads to 
measures producing legal effects concerning the data subject or does similarly significantly 
affect the interests, rights or freedoms of the concerned data subject shall not be based solely 
or predominantly on automated processing and shall include human assessment […]” [italics 
added]). Following this, the EP wanted to restrict automated decisions on a broader basis than 
the EC, i.e. those predominantly and not only solely on automated processes. With 
“predominantly” not being adopted in the final text of the GDPR, it would appear the strict 
reading of “solely” was intended. 
Questions can also be raised over what constitutes “legal effects” or “similarly 
significant effects”101 required for Article 22 to apply. Recital 71 provides some guidance, as 
it describes certain situations of “significances” e.g. online credit applications and e-recruiting 
practices. Where a decision has no legal or significant effect, Article 22 does not apply. For an 
automated decision to have legal effects on the data subjects, it would need to affect their legal 
status.102 Since in most cases the data subject has no legal right to be hired or to be approved 
for a credit application, cases of being denied an interview or credit by an automated process 
would not fall under these categories.103 Admittedly, such cases could be considered to have 
“similarly significant” effects. However, the term “similarly significant” is itself vague and 
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requires interpretation; significance varies on the perception of the data subject (effects of 
receiving a rejection letter will depend on the economic situation of the data subject, for 
instance), whereas impacts on legal status can be determined according to the letter of the 
law.104 Further, in practice it may cause a burden for the data subject to prove that processing 
affects them significantly.105 Alternatively an external standard for what constitutes significant 
effects could be defined. 
As these constraints demonstrate, the definition of automated decision-making in 
Article 22(1) significantly narrows the scope of any future right to explanation. Automated 
decision-making that does not meet the definition provided in Article 22(1) would not be 
constrained by provisions of Article 22, or the additional measures required as part of 
notification duties (Article 13(2)f and 14(2)g) or the right of access (Article 15(1)h), including 
information regarding the “logic involved” (see: Section 3.3). A right to explanation 
implemented through any of the four paths specified above would similarly not apply, still 
significantly narrowing the right’s potential applicability to a very narrow range of cases 
meeting all the requirements in Article 22(1) and discussed in this section. 
A further factor would constrain the information offered as part of an explanation. As 
indicated in the discussion of the right of access in the 1995 Directive, any future right to 
explanation would likely also be limited by overriding interests of the data controller. Recital 
63 of the GDPR similarly establishes that the right of access should not infringe upon the rights 
and freedoms of others, including data controllers. The right can be limited for the sake of trade 
secrets or intellectual property rights, especially regarding copyright of software. As with the 
right of access itself, the specific disclosure requirements of Recital 63 require interpretation.106 
The Recital notes that  
the result of those considerations should not be a refusal to provide all information to 
the data subject.  
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Jurisprudence and legal commentary concerning the Directive’s right of access (see Section 
3.3.1) suggest that the balance between the data subject’s right of access and data controllers’ 
rights and freedoms will require limited disclosures of the “logic involved” in automated 
decision-making, primarily concerning system functionality rather than the rationale and 
circumstances of specific decisions.  
 
4.2 Limitations exclusive to a right to explanation derived from safeguards against 
automated decision-making (Article 22(3)) 
In addition to the above limitations on a future right to explanation, a number of further 
limitations are exclusive to a right derived from Article 22(3). In the first instance, Article 22(2) 
states three conditions that, if met by an automated decision-making process, cause Article 
22(1) not to apply: 
(a) is necessary for entering into, or performance of, a contract between the data subject 
and a data controller;  
(b) is authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject and 
which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and 
freedoms and legitimate interests; or  
(c) is based on the data subject's explicit consent. 
Article 22(3) specifies that safeguards (i.e. the rights to human intervention, expression, and 
contest) only apply when automated decision-making meets Article 22(2)a or c. The scope of 
any future right to explanation enacted in relation to the safeguards specified in Article 22(3) 
is therefore limited to cases meeting clause (a) or (c), i.e. those necessary for entering or 
performing a contract,107 or with the subject’s explicit consent. It is worth noting that the 
safeguards in 22(3) do not apply when a decision is made in accordance with Union or Member 
State law (Article 22(2)b). In the latter case, explicit and specific safeguards are not described. 
Rather, “suitable measures to safeguard the data subject” must be laid down in the relevant 
Union or Member State law. This clause potentially excludes a significant range of cases of 
automated decision-making from the safeguards in Article 22(3) and any right to explanation 
derived thereof. German commentary on the GDPR has suggested that the “suitable measures” 
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called for in Article 22(2)b do not include the disclosure of the algorithm used due to the risk 
posed to trade secrets; however, measures to minimise and correct discrimination and biases 
should be implemented.108  
The exemption for automated decisions related to contracts raises a further limitation. 
Article 22 does not define when automated decision-making is “necessary” for entering or 
performing a contract, which runs the risk of ‘necessity’ being defined solely by the data 
controller. Additionally, it is important to note that Article 22(2)a envisions a situation that is 
different from explicit consent (which is listed as a separate exception in Article 22(2)c). 
Legislators were contemplating a situation where data controllers make automated decisions 
that are necessary for a contract, but without seeking consent first. If consent would be 
necessary, it would have been enough to list the contractual exception under Article 22(2)c. 
This structure suggests that there can be situations in which the data subject does not consent 
to an automated decision and, apart from the general notification requirements and right of 
access in Articles 13-15, does not know about the decision. Data controllers are therefore 
allowed to decide that automated decision-making is necessary for contractual obligations, 
while the data subject is unable to object to it. In this case, the data subject retains the right to 
contest, express views or obtain human intervention for a decision reached under Article 22(3), 
but not to object to it being made in the first place. 
4.2.1 Two interpretations of Article 22 
Several other restrictions on Article 22(3) and any future right to explanation derived thereof 
depend upon whether Article 22 is interpreted as a prohibition or a right to object. Article 22(1) 
GDPR states that “the data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based 
solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning 
him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.” Due to its language (“a right not to”), 
Article 22(1) can be interpreted in two ways: as a prohibition109 or a right to object to automated 
decision-making. The two interpretations offer very different protection to the interests of data 
subjects and data controllers.  
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The first interpretation reads Article 22(1) as a prohibition, meaning that data 
controllers would be obligated not to engage in automated decision-making prior to showing 
that a condition in Article 22(2)a-c is met. The second interpretation reads Article 22(1) as 
establishing for data subjects a right to object to automated decision-making, which will not 
apply if one of the requirements in Article 22(2)a-c are met. These interpretations are 
differentiated by whether action is required by the data subject to restrict automated decision-
making. The action in question, a formal objection by the data subject, requires both awareness 
of the existence of automated decision-making and a willingness to intercede, both of which 
require intentional effort on the part of the data subject.  
Notably, this ambiguity has existed since the Data Protection Directive 1995.110 The 
wording of Article 15 of the Directive111 allowed the ‘right not to be subject of an automated 
decision’ referred to in Section 1 (“Member States shall grant the right to every person not to 
be subject to a decision which produces legal effects concerning him or significantly affects 
him and which is based solely on automated processing […]” [italics added]) to be interpreted 
as a prohibition or a right to object.112 The ambiguity led Member States to implement this 
right and associated protections differently.  
Article 15 of the Directive has been implemented by Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Ireland as a general prohibition,113 with some 
exceptions. The UK has a different model: data subjects are entitled to request that no 
automated decision is made about them, but not in the case of so-called “exempt decisions.” In 
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cases where data subjects have not lodged such a request, data controllers have to inform them 
about the fact that an automated decision has been made as well as about the outcome.114  
Due to the similarities of language and content between Article 15 of the Directive and 
Article 22 GDPR, the varying implementation of Article 15 as a prohibition or right to object 
by Member states supports the interpretation that Article 22 is ambiguous and can be read as a 
prohibition or right to object. Resolving the ambiguity prior to 2018 is critical, as the two 
interpretations have very different consequences for data subjects and data controllers.  
4.2.2 Impact of the interpretation of Article 22 on a right to explanation 
If Article 22 is interpreted as a prohibition, data controllers will not be allowed to make 
automated decisions about a data subject until one of the three requirements specified in Article 
22(2) (necessary to enter or to perform a contract, authorised by law, or explicit consent) is 
met. Data subjects do not need to act to prevent automated decision-making, but are rather 
protected by default. Supervisory Authorities would shoulder the burden of enforcing Article 
22 by ensuring automated decision-making is carried out legally, and could levy penalties and 
fines in cases of illegal decision-making. Data controllers, when making automated decisions 
under Article 22(2)a or c, would need to enact safeguards as specified in Article 22(3). As 
explained above (see Section 4), these safeguards could be voluntarily or legally extended to 
include a right to explanation.  
If Article 22 is interpreted as a right to object, automated decision-making is restricted 
only to cases in which the data subject actively objects. When an objection is entered, decision-
making must be shown to meet Article 22(2)a-c. For automated decisions that meet a 
requirement of Article 22(2), the data subject cannot object. However, when Article 22(2)a or 
c is met – meaning that the decision is made under contract or with consent – the safeguards 
specified in Article 22(3) would also apply. In these cases, the data subject would be able to 
request human intervention, express her views, and contest the decision and, if enacted in the 
future, demand a right to explanation (see: Section 3.1). Critically, if Article 22 grants a right 
to object automated decision-making is legally unchallenged by default, even if it does not 
meet any of the requirements set out in Article 22(2), so long as the data subject does not enter 
an objection. This limitation increases the burden on data subjects to protect actively their 
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interests relating to profiling and automated decision-making by monitoring and objecting to 
automated decision-making. 
With this comparison in mind, interpreting Article 22 as a prohibition grants greater 
protections by default to data subject’s interests, at least in the cases in which Article 22(3) 
would apply. As a prohibition, data controllers would be legally obliged to limit automated 
decision-making meeting the definition in Article 22(1) to the three cases identified in Article 
22(2) (contract, Union or Member State law, consent).  
In contrast, a right to object would not pre-emptively restrict the types of automated 
decision-making undertaken by data controllers to the three cases defined in Article 22(2). 
Rather, these restrictions would only apply when a data subject lodged an objection against a 
specific instance of decision-making. At that point, processes not meeting a requirement of 
Article 22(2) would need to stop, and the safeguards specified in Article 22(2)b or Article 22(3) 
would never be triggered. Article 22 as a right to object would thus circumvent a right to 
explanation introduced through Article 22(3) by allowing automated decision-making not 
meeting a requirement in Article 22(2) to occur until the data subject enters an objection. Such 
‘legal’ but pre-objection decision-making would not be subject to a right to explanation derived 
from Article 22(3). With that said, a right to explanation derived from the right of access would 
not be similarly circumvented. In this case a data subject’s right to explanation would apply to 
any decision-making meeting the definition provided in Article 22(1), even if the decision-
making proved to not meet a requirement of Article 22(2) following the data subject’s 
objection.  
To summarise, if a right to explanation is enacted in the future, at best data subjects will 
only deserve an explanation when automated decisions have (1) legal or similarly significant 
effects, and (2) are based solely on automated processes. Further, if a right to explanation is 
derived specifically from Article 22(3), explanations will be required only if automated 
decision-making is (3) carried out to enter or under contract, or with explicit consent; and (4) 
when overriding interests of the data controller (e.g. trade secrets) do not exist, as specified in 
Recital 63. Further restrictions on a right to explanation derived from Article 22(3) depend 
upon the prevailing interpretation of Article 22 as a prohibition or a right to object.  
To disambiguate this limited type of right to explanation from the ‘general’ right to 
explanation in future discussion of the impact of the GDPR on automated processing of data, 
and to reflect accurately the scope of limitations on any such right, we recommend addressing 
instead a ‘right to be informed’ about the existence of automated decision-making and system 





functionality. The right to be informed addresses the information provided to data subjects 
about automated decision-making, taking into account all of the limitations on the scope of 
applicability and type of information to be provided by data controllers as described in the 
preceding two sections. The right to be informed further accounts for precedents set in the 1995 
Directive, and the impact these precedents will likely have on future interpretation of the 
GDPR’s notification duties (Articles 13-14), right of access (Article 15), and right not to be 
subject to automated decision-making (Article 22) 
 
5 Conclusion: the future of accountable automated decision-making 
Despite claims to the contrary, a meaningful right to explanation is not legally mandated by the 
General Data Protection Regulation. Given the proliferation of automated decision-making and 
automated processing of data to support human decision-making (i.e. ‘not solely’), this is a 
critical gap in transparency and accountability. The GDPR appears to give strong protection 
against automated decision-making but, as it stands, the protections may prove ineffectual. 
However, transparent and accountable automated decision-making can still be achieved before 
the GDPR comes into force in 2018. 
 A right to explanation of specific decisions is not legally mandated by the safeguards 
contained in Article 22(3), or notification duties in Articles 13 and 14. As proven by the 1995 
Directive, the right of access is ambiguous. However, the GDPR’s right of access provides a 
right to explanation of system functionality, what we call a ‘right to be informed’, restricted by 
the interests of data controllers and future interpretations of Article 15. Any future right to 
explanation will further be constrained by the definition of ‘automated decision-making’ in 
Article 22(1), which is limited to decisions based solely on automated processing with legal or 
similarly significant effects for the data subject. As it stands, a meaningful right of explanation 
to the rationale and circumstances of specific automated decisions is not forthcoming. 
Analysis of prior drafts of the GDPR has revealed several tensions between the 
European Parliament, Commission, and Council. The placement of the right to explanation in 
non-binding Recital 71 appears to be a purposeful change deliberated in trilogue. The EP 
generally sought stronger protections for data subjects against automated decision-making than 
the EC or Council. Specifically, the EP wanted to include a right to explanation in Article 20,115 
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whereas the Council would have preferred to have the right to explanation in Recital 58.116 The 
EC did not include such a right at all. Further, the EP wanted to protect citizens from automated 
decision that have legal or significant effects when predominantly,117 and not just solely,118 
based on automated processes. Human assessment would also have been required.119  
As the GDPR is intended to unify data protection law across all European Member 
States, the interpretation of Article 22 as a prohibition or right to object is critically important. 
Which interpretation will win out in the implementation of the GDPR in 2018 is not yet clear. 
Both are viable as suggested by the split in the implementation of Article 15 in the Data 
Protection Directive 1995 by Member States. Without clarification prior to enforcement, 
Article 22 will allow for conflicting interpretations of the rights of data subjects and controllers 
concerning automated decision-making across Member States. Conflicts may soon become 
inevitable because the two interpretations protect very different interests. 
Article 22 interpreted as a prohibition offers greater protection to the interests of data 
subjects by prohibiting all automated decision-making not meeting a requirement of Article 
22(2). In contrast, when interpreted as a right, Article 22 creates a loophole that allows data 
controllers to undertake automated decision-making without meeting a requirement in Article 
22(2), unless the data subject objects. Once an objection is entered, decision-making must be 
shown to meet one of these requirements or must stop altogether. As a right, the data subject’s 
interests in not being subjected to automated decision-making are undermined, insofar as 
significant effort (i.e. entering an objection) is required from the subject to protect her interests. 
Article 22 therefore roughly favours the interests of data subjects when interpreted as a 
prohibition, and the interests of data controllers when interpreted as a right.  
The ambiguity of the right not to be subject to automated decision-making (Article 22), and 
the loopholes and weaknesses it creates, shows that the GDPR is lacking precise language and 
explicit and well-defined rights and safeguards, and therefore runs the risk of being toothless. 
Several actions may be recommended to correct some of the weaknesses identified in our 
analysis. The following recommendations are intended as guidance for legislative and policy 
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steps to correct the deficiencies we have identified in the protections afforded to data subjects 
against automated decision-making.  
Legislative progress can be achieved by modifying the GDPR prior to its enforcement, or 
passage of additional laws by Member States. Additional legislative steps by Member States 
are highly likely, as seen with the UK’s House of Commons’ Science and Technology 
Committee’s recent inquiry on “algorithms in decision-making,”120 which was inspired in part 
by informal consultations by ‘Sense about Science’ (a UK-based charitable trust) with the 
authors of this paper. The inquiry gathers expert opinions on how to achieve accountability and 
transparency in algorithmic decision-making, including identification of barriers (e.g. trade 
secrets), mechanisms for oversight, and requirements to make decisions explainable. As 
evidence that the recommendations made here can be the starting point for new laws, the 
inquiry explicitly refers to the rights and duties laid out in the GDPR. On the policy side, the 
recommendations can influence future guidelines issued by bodies such as the Article 29 
Working Party, the European Data Protection Board, the European Data Protection Supervisor, 
and its Ethics Advisory Group. 
We make the following recommendations: 
 
1) Add a right to explanation to legally binding Article 22(3)  
If a right to explanation is intended as suggested in Recital 71, it should be explicitly added to 
a legally binding Article of the GDPR. Such an implementation should clarify the scope of 
applicability of the right with regard to the impact of Article 22 interpreted as a prohibition or 
right to object. Alternatively, Member States can be encouraged to implement law on top of 
the GDPR that requires an explanation of specific decisions. A right to explanation of specific 
decisions could be considered a suitable safeguard necessitated by Article 22(2)b and 22(3) if 
an explanation is necessary to contest a decision, as already prescribed in 22(3). The rights to 
contest a decision, to obtain human intervention or to express views granted in Article 22(3) 
may be meaningless if the data subject cannot understand how the contested decision was 
made. To this end, a right to explanation can be introduced requiring data controllers to provide 
information about the rationale of the contested decision. Clear requirements should be 
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introduced stating the evidence to be supplied by the data controller. Evidence regarding the 
weighting of features, decision tree or classification structure, and general logic of the decision-
making system may be sufficient. However, the risks for innovation and beneficial processing 
posed by a right to explanation that requires automated decision-making methods to be human 
interpretable should be seriously considered.121  
 
2) Clarify the meaning of the “existence of,” “meaningful information,” “logic involved,” 
“significance,” and “envisaged consequences” in Article 15(1)h. 
The language and meaning of core concepts in Article 15 is ambiguous. This leaves open the 
possibility of a right to explanation of the rationale of specific decisions (see Section 3.3.2). 
However, this interpretation is implausible for a number of reasons. As explained in Section 
3.3, the semantics and history of the right to access, and the duplication of provisions in Articles 
13-14, suggest that the right of access is intended merely as a counterweight to the notification 
duties of data controllers, and not as a means to introduce a new right (i.e. a right to explanation 
of specific decisions) beyond the scope of Articles 13-14.122 Critically, interpreting Article 15 
to introduce a right to explanation of specific decisions would not match the intended purpose 
of the right of access, which according to Recital 63 GDPR is meant to allow the data subject 
“to be aware of, and verify, the lawfulness of processing.” Language should be added to clarify 
that Article 15 is intended either as a counterweight to Articles 13-14, and thus provides a 
limited ‘right to be informed’ about the existence of automated decision-making as well as 
system functionality, or as a right to explanation of specific decisions. The intended meaning 
of the five core concepts of Article 15(1)h should be made explicit, and their impact on the 
information required for data controllers to communicate to data subjects under the right to 
access (and, similarly, Articles 13-14 notification duties).  
 
3) Clarify the language of Article 22(1) to indicate when decisions are based solely on 
automated processing 
Article 22 is limited in applicability to decisions based solely on automated processing. 
However, it is unclear what the phrase means in practice. The potential loophole (similarly 
seen in the German SCHUFA judgments), by which nominal involvement of a human at any 
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stage of the automated process means the process is not solely automated, should be closed. 
There is still uncertainty if the usage of automated processes for the preparation of a decision 
constitutes solely automated processes, if the human that takes the final decision does not wish 
to interfere or to adopt the decision. Clarification can be offered by returning to the phrasing 
“solely or predominantly based on” proposed by the EP123 in Article 20(5), or by providing 
specific examples of decision-making based solely and predominantly on automated 
processing of data.  
 
4) Clarify the language of Article 22(1) to indicate what counts as a legal or significant 
effect of automated decision, including profiling 
Article 22 only applies for automated decision-making with “legal effects” or “similarly 
significant effects.”124 Recital 71 only names two examples of such effects: automatic refusal 
of an online credit application and e-recruiting practices. The scope of these phrases should be 
made explicit: do they, for instance, refer only to effects identified in the Articles of the GDPR, 
or to some broader definition? At a minimum, the perspective to be taken in defining 
“significant effects” should be identified. Do effects need to be significant from the subjective 
perspective of the data subject or according to some external standard? 
 
5) Clarify the language of Article 22(2)a, “necessary for entering, or performance of a 
contract” 
Article 22(2)a names this case as an exception of either the prohibition of automated decision-
making or the right to object to automated decision-making. Since it is likely that the necessity 
of such measures will be defined by the data controller and lit (a) does not require consent of 
the data subject (since this is a separate exception listed under lit (c), this exemption runs the 
risk of weakening the rights of data subjects.  
 
6) Clarify the language of Article 22 to indicate a prohibition 
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Ideally, the language that allows for two plausible interpretations should be clarified prior to 
2018 when the GDPR comes into force. Due to the number of loopholes and weakening of 
Article 22(3) safeguards introduced if Article 22 is interpreted as a right to object, as well as 
wide implementation of Article 15 of the 1995 Directive as a prohibition, we recommend that 
the language used in Article 22(2) (“Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the decision:”) be revised to 
indicate clearly and explicitly that Article 22 is intended as a prohibition against automated 
decision-making. 
 
7) As a counterweight to trade secrets, introduce an external auditing mechanism for 
automated decision-making, or set internal auditing requirements for data controllers 
Both the right of access and any future right to explanation will face significant limitations due 
to the sensitivity of trade secrets and intellectual property rights. As our examination of the 
1995 Directive shows, explanations granted under the right of access are normally limited to 
system functionality and significantly limited to protect data controller interests. An ideal 
solution would allow for examination of automated decision-making systems, including the 
rationale and circumstances of specific decisions, by a trusted third party. This approach limits 
the risk to data controllers of exposing trade secrets, while also providing an oversight 
mechanism for data subjects that can operate when explanations are infeasible or too complex 
for lay comprehension. The powers of Supervisory Authorities could be expanded in this 
regard. Alternatively, a European regulator could be created specifically for auditing 
algorithms, before (certifications) and/or after algorithms are being deployed.125 
 
8) Support further research into the feasibility of explanations alternative accountability 
mechanisms  
Even if a right to explanation is legally granted in the future, the feasibility and practical 
requirements to offer explanations to data subjects remain unclear. In line with current work 
on interpretable automated decision-making and machine learning methods,126 research needs 
                                                 
 
125 Comparable approaches to regulating Big Data and algorithms have been suggested by: Viktor Mayer-
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(John Murray 2013); Andrew Tutt, ‘An FDA for Algorithms’ (Social Science Research Network 2016) SSRN 
Scholarly Paper ID 2747994 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2747994> accessed 13 April 2016. 
126 For a detailed discussion on regulatory and interpretability issues related to algorithms, see: Danielle Keats 
Citron and Frank A Pasquale, ‘The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions’ (Social Science 
Research Network 2014) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2376209 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2376209> 





to be conducted in parallel to determine whether and how explanations can and should be 
offered to data subjects (or proxies thereof) with differing levels of expertise and interests. 
What counts as a meaningful explanation for one individual or group may not be meaningful 
for another; requirements for ‘meaningful explanations’ must be set if a legal right to 
explanation is to be practically useful. The right to explanation is also not the only way to 
achieve accountability and transparency in automated decision-making.127 Further attention 
should be given to the development and deployment of alternative legal safeguards that can 
supplement the protections offered by the GDPR. Data controllers working in highly sensitive 
or risky sectors could, for instance, be required to use human interpretable decision-making 
methods.128 Methods and (ethical) requirements for auditing algorithms129 should also be 
further developed, both as standalone accountability tools and as mechanisms to provide an 
evidence trail for providing explanations of automated decisions. 
 
As the ambiguities highlighted in these recommendations indicate, the GDPR can be a toothless 
or powerful mechanism to protect data subjects depending on its eventual legal interpretation. 
The effectiveness of the new framework will largely be determined by Supervisory Authorities, 
the Article 29 Working Party, the European Data Protection Board, the European Data 
Protection Supervisor, its Ethics Advisory Group,130 as well as national courts and their future 
judgments.131 As it stands, transparent and accountable automated decision-making is not yet 
guaranteed by the GDPR; nor is a right to explanation of specific decisions forthcoming. At 
best, data subjects will be granted a ‘right to be informed’ about the existence of automated 
decision-making and system functionality. These shortcomings should be addressed before the 
GDPR comes into force in 2018. 
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